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This booklet originates out of a panel co-organized   
by the American Ethnological Society (AES), Hau, 
and L’Homme at the 2016 Meeting of the American 
Anthropological Association in  Minneapolis.  The 
aim was to hold an annual event debating terms play- 
ing a pivotal and timely role in cross-cultural anal- 
ysis. While rejecting the notion that one can describe a 
keyword as a cross-cultural heuristic, and despite 
agreeing that much of culture and society hap- pens in 
“what goes without saying,” the debate wanted to 
highlight how the struggle in the use of language to 
encompass human experiences may give expression to 
realities that carry family resemblances. The organizers 
concurred that one of the crucial tasks of anthropol- 
ogy is to highlight the negation or inversion between 
familiar terms, a disjunctive homonymity that could 
be resolved by the formulation of novel worldviews or 
theoretical translations and advancements. 
Fakes, forgery, counterfeits, hoaxes, frauds, knock- 
offs—such terms speak,  ostensibly,  to the inverse 
of truth or the obverse of authenticity and sincerity. 
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Do all cultures equally spend an incredible amount   
of energy and labor on detecting differences between 
the phony and the genuine? What does the modern 
human obsession with fabrications and frauds tell us 
about our- selves? And what can anthropology tell us 
about this obsession? 
Fakery, forgery, fiction, as well as the verb “to feign” 
stem from Latin verbs referring to the productive, 
creative, and inventive activity of shaping and mold- 
ing, facere, fabricare, and fingere, and cannot be clearly 
distinguished from poetic and poietic activity. A very 
strong commitment to authenticity appears in many 
contemporary manifestations of religious radicalism, 
yet a fundamental ambivalence towards reality inhabit 
several cosmologies and may be found in the Sanskrit 
concept of māyā,“illusion,”“magic,”“trick.” Fakery and 
tricksters may serve to outwit others, but along with 
this negative and unfavorable connotation of decep- 
tion or ruse the concepts may open up creative acts   
or achievements of something good. Everyday life 
dwells in a totalizing and unambiguous commitment 
to sincerity and authenticity, and Western philosophi- 
cal and ethical conceits about deception tend to stand 
in contradistinction to regimes of “truth” and function 
instrumentally—i.e., through misdirection and/or fal- 
sification for either negative or positive ends, a trope 
that goes back as far as Plato’s “noble lie.” Yet ritual 
theory and anthropological studies of playing teach 
people to experience the world as deceptive, ambig- 
uous, and uncertain and accept the productive role of 
the subjunctive, the fake, and other—“as if ”—modes 
of relationships with the fabricated. 
Although  ideas  of  malpractice  as  incompetence 
or ignorance are found in many different ancient and 
modern contexts, the idea of fake as a simulation of  
an authentic/original behavior is more difficult to  find 
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in ancient worlds and seems to be a modern semantic 
shift. Parrhesia, the Greek’s practice of frank truth tell- 
ing famously studied by Foucault, cannot be separat- 
ed from fakery, forgery, enchantment through speech 
acts which have become forms of knowledge enacted 
by tragedy, comedy, or political oratory. Statecraft and 
kingship often operate through stratagems and tricks 
that the king should use in order to create the illusion 
of a totalizing power. Hoaxes and frauds inhabit aca- 
demia, yet plagiarism highlights a delicate boundary 
between theft of knowledge and its imitation to gener- 
ate novel views. Imposter religious figures, fake goods, 
fake identities, corrupted foods, counterfeit medica- 
tions, copyrights and “copy left,” can all be employed 
towards the service or revelation of truth. Where trust 
and truth have been deemed the glue of human re- 
lationships and the motor of cooperative interactions, 
this booklet showcases cultural contexts where 
deception and mistrust flourish and seem to produce 
effective, albeit opaque, forms of sociality. 

chapter 1
Fakes, damned fakes, and 
ethnography 
John L. Jackson, Jr., University of 
Pennsylvania
I first read In Search of Respect as a graduate student, 
and it really moved me—in a few sections, almost to 
tears (Bourgois 1996). I appreciated its raw power, its 
unblinking commitment to a kind of hyperrealist yet 
nonromanticized rendition of drug culture in East 
Harlem. It was like no ethnography I’d encountered 
before. I was also pretty sure that this Philippe Bour-
gois person, whoever he was, had made the stuff up. 
Maybe not all of it, but enough. I figured that there 
was little chance he could have gotten these drug deal-
ers and their families to disclose so much about them-
selves, no way they would allow him to witness these 
intimate—and sometimes illicit—aspects of their daily 
lives. I didn’t believe it. 
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That was my initial stance on the Bourgois book’s 
veracity, a position I held before starting my own eth-
nographic research in New York, first among Hebrew 
Israelites in Brooklyn and then with Manhattan-
ites negotiating gentrification and other class-based 
tensions on the other side of Harlem from where 
Bourgois conducted his study. Once I began my first 
fieldwork stint, I found out pretty quickly that people 
are prone to sharing all kinds of private and person-
al information about themselves with would-be eth-
nographers, information that they have absolutely no 
business sharing—precious and potentially damaging 
stuff about existential dilemmas and familial dysfunc-
tions, about their most self-destructive addictions and 
hate-saturated political perspectives. Anthropological 
methods exploit our seemingly species-based tendency 
to divulge inappropriate amounts of personal informa-
tion to people who are adept at displaying a sincere 
interest in hearing it. (This is all the more reason to re-
mind ourselves that Institutional Review Boards don’t 
nearly get to the heart of the matter in terms of how 
complicated “the field” actually is as a moral landscape, 
which is why we have to continue reimagining and 
recalibrating the ethical coefficients that ground any 
ethnographic gambit.)
Of course, “truth is stranger than fiction,” and eth-
nographers don’t have to concoct fanciful and com-
pletely made-up stories out of thin air to get at the 
complex and cathected intricacies of people’s cultur-
al worlds. Even still, one thing we’ve learned is that 
in a methodologically and intellectually compelling 
sense, all ethnographers are liars. That’s because all 
ethnography is fabrication and invention, fakery of the 
highest representational order. Not because research-
ers are trying to be dishonest and tell untruths, but 
as a function of the fact that every depiction is never 
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simply or simplistically a straightforward reflection 
of what one stumbles upon while traipsing around 
some hard and fast field-site. Any ethnography is an 
authorial construction, a collaborative one, no doubt, 
but no less contrived because of such on-the-ground 
partnerships between researcher and researched. That 
is a post-Writing Culture truism, and it insists that eth-
nography is worth doing precisely because it doesn’t 
pretend itself into a land of scientistic objectivity as 
easily and effortlessly as other disciplines’ methods do 
(Clifford and Marcus 1986; see also Starn 2015). 
All forms of ostensible fakery are hardly fake in ex-
actly the same ways. The ethnographic lens provides an 
angle on cultural universes that is fine-grained, specif-
ically contextualized, and particularly good at reward-
ing careful interrogation of its implicit maneuvers. 
And this isn’t about navel gazing as the coolest form of 
intellectual solipsism; it means examining material and 
discursive practices/processes in the manufacturing of 
anthropological claims and facts to help explain how 
we create the tales we believe about the world and our 
collective places in it. 
I am fond of telling my students—too flippantly, 
perhaps—that ethnography is a powerful and effective 
way to manipulate other people. And it is not just such 
a potential manipulation once translated to the printed 
page. It also instantiates a kind of inevitable social dis-
simulation in the field. What difference does it make, 
say, to cultivate something that might look and feel 
like friendship under the auspices of social scientific 
research? And maybe more pointedly, how might eth-
nographic encounters create a potentially significant 
venue for changing other people’s minds without ex-
plicitly declaring to do so? 
One way to get people to rethink some of their most 
cherished perspectives is to listen to them carefully 
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and ask pointed follow-up questions about why they 
believe what they believe, especially when said beliefs 
seem crazy or offensive, mean-spirited or exclusionary. 
I once had an Italian-American tow-truck driver in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, make what seemed like a 
truly earnest effort to bond with me in the cab of his 
vehicle (while he was towing my car) by railing against 
those “Mexicans” destroying the South Philadelphia 
neighborhood where he grew up.1 My response to 
his heartfelt but hostile diatribe was to ask a series of 
questions about his statements that prompted him to 
unpack these contentions more explicitly, his answers 
to my queries slowly demonstrating the contradictions 
and incoherencies of his position. (Why were his im-
migrant forbears any more deserving of support than 
current arrivals when the two immigrant sagas are so 
similar?) A genuinely proffered question that shows 
one has intently listened and truly wants to know more 
about what an interlocutor thinks can be far more 
piercing and impactful (in terms of getting people to 
ponder their own perspectives) than screaming about 
someone’s racist xenophobia. (“What makes Mexicans 
so different?” “Do they face any of the same challenges 
that new arrivals from Italy had to deal with in the 
early twentieth century, foreigners like your grandpar-
ents?” “How important was Christianity to you and 
your family during your childhood?” “Mexican arriv-
als sometimes seem to demonstrate more explicitly 
religious commitments than native-born Americans, 
no? If so, does that feel familiar given the history of 
Italian investments in Catholicism in urban America?” 
And on and on I went, for the bulk of our relatively 
1. I relay a version of this story in Daniels and Jackson 
(2014).
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brief ride together.) I didn’t change the tow-driver’s 
mind on the spot that day, but I would be surprised if 
I hadn’t helped to plant just a few more tiny seeds in 
the garden of his own self-doubt about such easy eth-
no-racial scapegoating. Or maybe I was just nurturing 
seeds sown by previous cultural interlocutors. Either 
way, my question marks were lies meant to change his 
view, and I was willing to accept a wide horizon for 
determining success. 
All of this talk about the fictional underpinnings 
of ethnography is no consolation for sociologist Alice 
Goffman and the heat she faced with the publication 
of her first book, heat that came with much less light 
than some critics might proclaim (Goffman 2014). 
Goffman’s work among black men “on the run” from 
the law is a piercing interrogation of what fugitivity 
feels like in contemporary, urban Black America. And 
several reviewers have publicly called it out as a “fake” 
of ethically damning proportions, nothing more than 
a self-aggrandizing lie told in explicitly ethnograph-
ic registers.2 Of course, if you were to scrutinize just 
about any other ethnographic monograph the way hers 
was intricately unpacked and dissected, you’d likely see 
striking inconsistencies and implausibilities, which 
need not mean that those other ethnographic research-
ers (or Goffman) are explicitly attempting to misrep-
resent what they experienced in the field. Michael 
Taussig, for one, is good at vouching for the facticity of 
his observations while concomitantly (and even affec-
tionately) labeling ethnography as “the really made up” 
(Taussig 2011). For Taussig, it isn’t a zero-sum scenario 
wherein either we are being honest about what we wit-
nessed during fieldwork or we are making it up. Our 
2. For one such critique of Goffman, see Forman (2014).
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job is to theorize the inescapable simultaneity of those 
two possibilities. That is akin to science-fiction writer 
Samuel R. Delaney admitting in his autobiography, The 
Motion of Light in Water, that he had spent years with a 
date for his own father’s death that felt right and cor-
rect to him even though he was later able to verify that 
he had been living with a date that was off by a full 
year in terms of its chronological accuracy. His father 
had died. Delaney attended the funeral. None of that 
was fudged. And it was a significant loss for him. No 
question about it. Still, he improperly filed this gloomy 
event away into a temporal muck that was convincing-
ly wrong though it seemed somehow true. 
So, although I initially thought that Philippe 
Bourgois was a liar, the same way Goffman is being 
characterized in much of the popular press, I hadn’t 
conducted my own research yet and didn’t quite realize 
that perfectly reasonable and otherwise cautious peo-
ple would be totally fine—after a few months of “deep 
hanging out”—with the idea of telling an ethnogra-
pher things they should probably have been cautioned 
against divulging, intimate details about their worlds, 
sometimes utterly unflattering facts or ugly allegations, 
which isn’t to say that folks don’t lie to researchers too, 
or that they don’t ham in front of the proverbial eth-
nographic camera, playing things up for the sake of an 
anthropological gaze. People perform for the research-
er’s benefit all the time, which serves as yet another 
reason why ethnography takes nuance and subtlety to 
distill with any kind of explanatory confidence. (Think, 
here, of Clifford Geertz’s classic twitches, winks, and 
faked/simulated winks discussion; Geertz 1973.3) 
3. For my own idiosyncratic critique of how we might 
reconceptualize/redeploy “thick description” in 
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I’ve long been partial to the likes of Jean Baudril-
lard, scholar of the simulacra, champion of the notion 
that in a nihilistic world “theoretical violence, not 
truth, is the only resource left to us” (1994: 163). Vi-
olently reworking his analytical logics, one might say 
that there is no ethnographic real at all. There couldn’t 
be. It is fakery all the way down the ethnographic rab-
bit hole. Fake friendships. Fake data. Fake feelings. 
Fake science. For him, In Search of Respect may never 
have been written (Baudrillard 1995). That is, there is 
so much structural imbalance in the relationship be-
tween elite academic researchers and poor urban res-
idents that ethnography as a scholarly pursuit may be 
doomed from the start, doomed to nonexistence when 
judged on any of the terms that would give it true epis-
temological purchase or ontological value. 
And there are so many other ways in which “the 
fake” has defined and overdetermined anthropological 
question-asking, past and present. Racial categories 
are a form of fakery that anthropology helped dress 
up and make respectable in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, a sin for which the disci-
pline continues to do penance today, this promoting 
of what some have called fake biology, a fake biology 
that still viscerally controls the thinking and feeling 
of so many racialized subjects around the world (even 
if racial investments and taxonomies are situationally 
distinct). Leo Felton is a powerful textbook example of 
such deep-seated and visceral control. He is a “mixed 
race” love child of the 1960s who had to pretend to be 
a dark southern Italian so that he could conspire with 
skinhead allies in a plot to blow up Jewish monuments 
contemporary anthropological discussions, see Jackson 
(2014). 
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in Massachusetts ( Jackson 2008). Once arrested and 
exposed as a fake-Nazi, as not really “white,” as some-
one passing for Italian-American, Felton confessed to 
reporters that he was fully aware of race’s biological 
immateriality. However, his recognition of race’s status 
as a biological lie, a scientific fiction, didn’t dampen 
his commitments to white supremacy. Knowing race’s 
fakery didn’t inoculate him from its misplaced iden-
tificatory trickery. When it comes to negotiating such 
tricks, you can be in on the hoax and still get uncon-
trollably caught up in its canard. 
As a researcher, I used to have an overly romantic 
notion of what “the fake” could accomplish, of what 
purposeful fakery could do. You can spy it in some of 
my early work. In Real Black: Adventures in Racial Sin-
cerity, I intimate that knockoffs, counterfeit commod-
ities, misappropriated goods and services, might just 
gum up aspects of our global capital system in service 
to those most precariously perched within it, those 
with the least access to spoils of capitalist success based 
on material accumulation ( Jackson 2005). I wanted to 
imagine the ambiguities and ambivalences such coun-
terfeits promote as potentially counterhegemonic re-
sponses to the most lopsided versions of capitalist pos-
sibility—even though I’d already read anthropological 
theorist Rosalind Morris make a powerful case (in a 
discussion of gender and sexuality) against such fet-
ishized assumptions about foregone political conclu-
sions flowing automatically from ambiguity’s seductive 
promises (Morris 1995). Invoking the “fake” need not 
mean empowering the marginalized. Indeed, it could 
manufacture a sense of uncertainty in ways that re-
produce conventional status hierarchies and intensify 
material inequities. 
Just one example to highlight the point. It is prob-
lematic when concerns about so-called “fake news” 
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seek to make all news coverage suspect and nonau-
thoritative, when one is forced to come to the defense 
of journalism, the fourth estate, as powerful political 
operatives demonize and delegitimize it in the eyes of 
a larger body politic. In some ways, journalism is a lot 
like ethnography in its practitioners’ ability/need to 
listen to important storytellers—and insofar as jour-
nalists should hardly boast too confidently about pris-
tine access to objectivity, no matter how carefully they 
stick to time-tested formulas for how to organize leads 
and structure the unfurling of copy for “hard news” ar-
ticles—a hardness of a piece, aspirationally, with the 
harder social sciences (the disciplines more respected 
and generally better compensated than their suppos-
edly softer disciplinary cousins). But there is fake, and 
then there is fake. That is, it makes no sense to imagine 
that babies and bathwater are the same thing just be-
cause they are both constituted by atoms. 
While a graduate student, a few years before I first 
read Bourgois and conducted my own ethnographic 
research, I had the surreal experience of being in hos-
tile theory courses in the 1990s at Columbia Univer-
sity, which was, back then, a decidedly Saidian insti-
tution. Everyone was reading/assigning Orientalism, 
and many scholarly pronouncements on campus were 
explicitly backstopped by invocations of Michel Fou-
cault. So, I shouldn’t have been surprised that I found 
myself enrolled in graduate anthropology courses with 
students from the Department of English who were 
telling all of us anthropology students—in what felt 
like every single comment made during every one of 
our class sessions—that the discipline of Anthropol-
ogy is so tainted and corrupt that it shouldn’t exist. 
Period. Under any circumstance. It was intellectual-
ly irredeemable, epistemologically bankrupt. There is 
nothing good that can come from studying under the 
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auspices of this handmaiden of colonialism, they said. 
Ethnography is an imperialist intellectual project par 
excellence. Why would a poor black boy from Brooklyn 
be in bed with such a racist disciplinary formation? 
And I was made to defend a field that I (more than 
them, I thought) also recognized had had a problem-
atic racialist/colonialist history. However, that history 
didn’t mean that its approach to social analysis was 
completely invalid—or beyond reimagination. 
As a matriculating PhD student, I had been fond 
of invoking (still do from time to time) the classic line 
from anthropologist John Gwaltney’s exchange with a 
black factory worker, Othman Sullivan, who expressed 
deep skepticism about the discipline: “I think this an-
thropology is just another way of calling me a nigger” 
(Gwaltney 1993). Sullivan’s suspicion resonated. So, 
it felt weird to have to defend the field to dismissive 
colleagues from English, especially since I agreed with 
some of their critiques. That situation feels similar to 
my rabid desire these days to defend journalism from 
current hashtagged attacks calling its most standard of 
industry practices “fake news,” politics baked into re-
portage in what is supposed to be fatally flawed ways. 
Journalists are already in trouble as a function of recent 
changes in our larger technological and media envi-
ronment/landscape, which makes the “fake news” talk-
ing point feel like overkill. If the news is fake, it is fake 
the way the best anthropology is fake, “really made up” 
so as to show us how we fashion ourselves into col-
lective existence in the most compelling way possible. 
All ethnographers are liars, but we are not alone. 
And it is important to remember that the ethnograph-
ic project is susceptible to some of the same pressures 
recasting our larger public culture. The erosion of 
trust in the news media and in science (from dismiss-
als of climate change to conspiracies about vaccines) 
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help to explain what ethnography looks like perched 
rather precariously at the center of a Venn diagram 
where those two institutional formations (journalism 
and science) might be said to meet. Moreover, the in-
creasing polarization of public discourse all around the 
globe maps quite interestingly onto the polarization 
of contemporary scholarly debates, with quantitative 
social scientists and qualitative social scientists often 
participating in radically different conversations (their 
own echo chambers) and openly hostile to proclaimed 
limitations of the other domain’s epistemological and 
methodological presuppositions. 
In the context of an increasing public dismissal of 
science and journalism as little more than partisan/
ideological propaganda, is there some way to make a 
case for the ongoing value of relatively neutral players/
arbiters/chroniclers/storytellers on issues of fact and 
truth in contemporary society? Can any organization/
expert/authority claim enough independence, reliance 
on empirical reality, and aspirational  objectivity to 
serve as an honest broker in our increasingly politicized 
public conflagrations? To use an admittedly too-sim-
ple baseball metaphor, who can be trusted to just call 
“balls” and “strikes”? Is there any way to regain public 
confidence in societal institutions aimed at doing just 
that—calling the sociopolitical equivalent of balls and 
strikes—even as we remain conscious of the fact that 
science and journalism (and ethnography!) are cultural 
practices that don’t have any special or magical access 
to undeniable truth? 
Ethnography is a literary genre and methodologi-
cal approach that thrives in educating people about the 
complicated and inextricable interconnections between 
subjectivity and objectivity, fact and opinion, politics 
and scholarship. It isn’t one-size-fits-all—that is, dif-
ferent ethnographers walk the tightrope between such 
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polarities quite differently. But the fact that ethnogra-
phers are willing to call attention to their subjectivities 
is an incredibly important point. To own up to the hu-
man partiality that makes us cultural liars, no matter 
how empirically rigorous the groundwork our claims 
rest upon, and to tell inevitable lies in ways that res-
onate with what we think we have come to know and 
trust about the observable world are, in many ways, the 
nearest scholarly interventions get to virtue. 
Of course, lying isn’t virtuous simply because 
one has convinced oneself of that lie’s verity. George 
Costanza, one of Jerry Seinfeld’s often hilarious side-
kicks on the comedian’s eponymously titled 1990s sit-
com, Seinfeld, and played with zany virtuosity by Jason 
Alexander, offered up the most cited line in that hit 
show’s almost decade-long run. Explaining why he is 
a breathtakingly masterful liar, George tells Jerry, in 
an assuredly relaxed and self-confident tone, his arm 
outstretched casually along the back of a booth at the 
fictional Manhattan eatery, Monk’s Café, “Jerry, just 
remember: it’s not a lie if you believe it.” Almost as a 
kind of teaser for the master class George could surely 
teach on effective dissimulation, he offers this tidbit 
to explain his own dexterity with dishonesty. Jerry 
takes the advice in, pauses for a second, and then nods 
knowingly, as though the deep philosophical point 
George has proffered will shore Jerry up for his at-
tempt to beat a polygraph test at a local police sta-
tion (over something as utterly innocuous as whether 
or not he watches the TV melodrama Melrose Place, 
which he is too proud to admit). 
Any too-quick rhetorical move from the neces-
sary fictions of urban ethnography in Harlem to the 
cockamamy advice of a fictional TV character set in 
a make-believe New York about two miles away has 
probably slid quite squarely into the absurd. But an 
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absurdist register may be just what the contemporary 
order requires. Baudrillard’s “theoretical violence” is 
boldly absurdist in its eccentric and perplexing asser-
tions about what constitutes the real world, almost as 
though to combine purposeful agitprop and disin-
formation campaigning with unwieldy nonsense and 
dizzying hot air. And all of this circulates globally 
within a new media technocracy that connects the 
planet’s farthest flung fringe groups into an immedi-
ate communicative praxis, creating for them an overly 
robust sense of their own nonmarginality, regardless 
of how ridiculous their contentions might be, conten-
tions about fake science (climate change), fake news 
(journalism), fake Americans (Latino drug dealers), or 
supposedly fake versions of anything else. These folks 
calling out “fakes” at every turn, often in conspiratorial 
tones, genuinely believe what they espouse, but stub-
born believing doesn’t make up for the fact that con-
fident claims can pivot on longstanding investments 
in self-delusion and self-interested social exclusions. 
That is only part of what makes ethnographic forms of 
counterrepresentation as important as ever.
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 Your gimmick is mediocre,
 The jig is up, I seen you from a mile away…
 —Kendrick Lamar
Too often in the history of the discipline, anthropolo-
gists, acting out the intellectual reflexes of liberal hu-
manism, have entangled themselves in the hubris of 
exposing fakes. Masked ritual offers a prime example: 
Michael Taussig (1999, 2003) has analyzed a number 
of ethnographic accounts that write off the mask and 
the entire arena of ritualistic special effects of which it 
is a privileged part as trickery visited upon credulous 
dupes by cunning deceivers. Once the artifice was de-
bunked, the ethnographer’s work seemed done. There 
was little left to offer by way of interpretation. “The 
issue seems to me,” Taussig writes, “not one of affir-
mation, but of negation,” where the supernatural man-
ifestation “is unmasked not as a symbol, not as a sign, 
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not as a substitute, but as a deliberately contrived fake” 
(1999: 141). It is surprising how often such negation 
can still insidiously stifle analysis.
To avoid repeating this error, it is perhaps im-
portant that we distinguish between two kinds of 
fakes, which I will provisionally call mere fakes and 
deep fakes. Mere fakes are inferior imitations of the 
real, counterfeits or phonies introduced into social 
settings to leverage an otherwise unearned advantage. 
The merely fake can be ingeniously deceptive, but it 
is ultimately an instrumentality whose appetitive mo-
tivations are never that mysterious. The deep fake is 
something different—the product of beguiling arti-
fice, to be sure, but with symbolism that transcends 
whatever limited strategic advantage fakery might 
confer. Its uncertain motivations are wrapped in im-
penetrable layers of meaning. On closer inspection, 
it may begin to seem indistinguishable from culture 
itself—a web of significance we ourselves have spun, 
to follow Clifford Geertz’s (1973: 5) lead a bit further. 
It is deception in which everyone can simultaneously 
play the role of addresser and addressee, deception in 
which everyone is implicated as both part deceiver 
and part deceived.
Intersections between mere fakery and deep fak-
ery are particularly fertile, it turns out, for anthropo-
logical analysis. Sites where instrumental imitations 
enter into cosmological dramas reveal the mecha-
nisms of cultural ontogenesis at work. For instance, 
in his study of the traffic in counterfeit brand-name 
clothing among street-hustling Ivoirian dandies, Sa-
sha Newell (2013: 140) shows how “fakes” can be 
“treated as authentic sources of power and value, even 
when—or precisely because—the deceit is known to 
its targets and performers.” Like the mask, these mere 
fakes become symbolically charged when brazenly 
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animated in performances of cosmopolitanism, con-
noisseurship, and modernity.
Another fascinating example comes from Winnie 
Won Yin Wong’s (2014) ethnography of the global 
trade in mass-produced imitations of Western art-
works hand-painted in Chinese workshops. Wong 
finds that, in the West, exoticizing representations of 
these Chinese painters as heteronomous sweatshop 
counterfeiters go hand-in-hand with commissions of 
their “fakes” by conceptual artists making effete meta-
commentary on the status of art. She shows how the 
Western art world uses Chinese fakes to sustain its 
necessary “myth” of the artist’s
unalienated labor as steadfastly as the price of art 
ascends. But… the value-laden apparatus on which 
the myth of originality depends reveals itself to be 
beholden to a set of false inequalities, one that trades 
in provincial exoticisms of true art and authentic 
selves. Universal values function, in the implicit 
claims of cosmopolitans, only as a moving goal-
post that reinforces the insurmountable difference 
between appropriation and alienation, between the 
real and the fake. (Wong 2014: 237)
In exploring the creative agency and professional au-
tonomy of the Chinese painters who mass-produce 
these fakes, Wong’s ethnographic perspective again 
reveals complex interminglings of mereness and 
deepness.
* * * * *
Among the places one might further explore the in-
terplay between mere fakes and deep fakes through 
this kind of anthropological lens, I focus in the rest 
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of this essay on the antics of one category of faker 
who, at least in the United States, has been the ob-
ject of intense and ongoing cultural elaboration: the 
confidence man. The figure of the confidence man is 
no less American that the term itself, which dates to 
an 1849 New York Herald story; his special kind of 
fakesterism is the product of specific historical condi-
tions, which have also imbued him with longstanding 
cultural appeal as an amoral archetype (Cook 2001: 
201–2). Herman Melville’s 1857 novel The Confidence 
Man distinguished the eponymous protagonist as the 
American culture hero par excellence, and it is to that 
book that I turn for the rest of my discussion.
A kind of national allegory set on a Mississippi riv-
erboat called the Fidèle, the novel describes encounters 
between a shape-shifting confidence man (one is never 
quite sure how many distinct guises he assumes) and 
passengers who represent a bestiary of American types, 
a revel of American contradictions; one character refers 
to the lot of them as “a flock of fools, under this cap-
tain of fools, in this ship of fools” (Melville 1857: 21). 
Melville’s picaresque is the perfect national fable, an 
American masterpiece of what Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) 
calls the “polyphonic novel,” in which an authoritative, 
authorial voice is drowned out by a welter of competing 
perspectives and irreconcilable ideologies, expanding in 
proportion to the complexity of the heterogeneous so-
cial reality that it seeks to encompass.
The Mississippi itself is a crucially significant set-
ting. The nation’s largest river, it was a vital economic 
artery and source of wealth, as well as a destination 
in its own right for tourists and pleasure-seekers 
(Sir Edward Burnett Tylor would have been a con-
valescent tourist there around the time Melville was 
finishing the novel). Moreover, in 1857 the river, as 
a geographical boundary, was a politically charged 
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symbol for a transitional historical moment, signify-
ing both the “manifest destiny” of westward expansion 
and the antebellum controversy over slavery, both key 
themes in the novel.
Melville’s riverboat is a space of virtually anony-
mous sociability: “at every landing, the huge Fidèle … 
receives additional passengers in exchange for those 
that disembark; so that, though always full of strangers, 
she continually, in some degree, adds to, or replaces 
them with strangers still more strange” (Melville 1857: 
8–9). A microcosm for a nation of colonists and im-
migrants constantly fanning toward the fringes of a 
retreating frontier in search of new fortunes and new 
beginnings, the Fidèle constitutes a liminal setting 
where identities can be shed and remade, where the 
confidence man is perfectly in his element.
That the confidence man should ply the decks of 
such a riverboat has a substantial basis in historical 
fact. In his colorful ethnography of American con 
artists written almost a century later, David Maurer 
explains:
The ease with which people make travelling ac-
quaintances may account for the great number of 
marks [i.e., victims] which are roped [i.e., lured into 
con games] on trains or ships. When a mark is off 
his home ground, he is no longer so sure of himself; 
he likes to impress important-looking strangers; he 
has the leisure to become expansive, and he likes to 
feel that he is recognized as a good fellow. The natu-
ral barriers to friendships with strangers come down. 
(1940: 116)
Insofar as the mark’s own desire to promulgate an 
impressive self-image impels the confidence game 
(Goffman 1952), all people are in a way con artists—and 
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many of the “straight” passengers the confidence man 
encounters aboard the Fidèle prove crooked in their 
own right. Lucky for him: “a confidence man prospers 
only because of the fundamental dishonesty of his vic-
tim” (Maurer 1940: 16).
Who or what exactly the confidence man is, 
Melville never quite specifies. At times he is diabolical; 
at others, Christ-like (see Hyde 1998: 83). A mystical 
philosopher ironically warns the confidence man him-
self against keeping company with a certain Charlie 
Noble, whom he calls
an operator, a Mississippi operator; an equivocal 
character. That he is such, I little doubt, having had 
him pointed out to me as such by one desirous of 
initiating me into any little novelty of this western 
region, where I never before traveled. And, sir, if I 
am not mistaken, you also are a stranger here (but, 
indeed, where in this strange universe is not one a 
stranger?) and that is a reason why I felt moved to 
warn you against a companion who could not be 
otherwise than perilous to one of a free and trustful 
disposition. (Melville 1857: 306)
What does it mean for everyone to be a “stranger,” as 
the mystic says? Georg Simmel describes the stranger 
as someone who “is not radically committed to the 
unique ingredients and peculiar tendencies of the 
group, and therefore approaches them with a specific 
attitude of ‘objectivity.’ But objectivity does not sim-
ply involve passivity and detachment; it is a particular 
structure composed of distance and nearness, indiffer-
ence and involvement” (1950: 404). Thus, the stranger 
“often receives the most surprising openness—con-
fidences which sometimes have the character of a 
confessional and which would be carefully withheld 
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from a more closely related person.” But this peculiar 
position of proximity and distance also subjects the 
stranger to “many dangerous possibilities” (1950: 405), 
marking him as an object of perpetual suspicion and 
potential recrimination. So what does it mean if this 
condition of estrangement is generalized to encompass 
all relationships in the “strange universe” of Melville’s 
America?
Fellow travelers aboard the Fidèle face competing 
impulses to both trust and suspect one another, ex-
aggerated by the conditions of anonymity. The confi-
dence man knows how to exploit these contradictions 
perfectly, using suspicion to win trust and trust to dis-
arm suspicion. Thus, on the verge of selling an oppor-
tunistic “good merchant” fake shares in the fictitious 
Black Rapids Coal Company, the confidence man, 
who, in a series of successive guises has been cultivat-
ing (and bleeding) this particular mark for a number of 
chapters, feigns candor: 
“Dear me, you don’t think of doing any business 
with me, do you? In my official capacity I have not 
been authenticated to you. … I, being personally a 
stranger to you, how can you have confidence in me?”
 “Because,” knowingly smiled the good merchant, 
“if you were other than I have confidence that you 
are, hardly would you challenge distrust that way.” 
(Melville 1857: 84–85)
The confidence man’s notion of authentication is fas-
cinating here, taking us to the heart of how fakery 
functions. The fake is only possible when there are 
normative, conventionalized, institutionalized stand-
ards of conduct and evidentiary practices that the faker 
can manipulate. Mary Bucholtz and Kira Hall (2005: 
601) “call attention not to authenticity as an inherent 
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essence, but to authentication as a social process.” 
Elsewhere, Bucholtz (2003: 408) calls authentication 
“the tactic … that produces authenticity as its effect.” 
Just as the authentic is always performative, so too is 
the fake, employing and revealing the tactics whereby 
authenticity itself is achieved. 
In the scene above, the confidence man ingeniously 
proves his sincerity by casting suspicion on his own 
authenticity. Following John Jackson (2005), then, 
we must also consider sincerity above and perhaps 
beyond just authenticity—and not only sincerity, but 
what we might also call tactics of sincerification. Sin-
cerification displaces authentication, which, aboard 
the Fidèle is constantly deferred, there being always 
only other strangers to vouch for one’s good character. 
Sincerity—perhaps the most privileged attribute of 
modern selfhood (Seligman et al. 2008)—becomes the 
primary currency of self-authenticating performativity. 
The confidence man exploits the inherently dram-
aturgical nature of social life and, not surprisingly, the-
atrical imagery abounds in the novel. As one character 
says, “to do, is to act; so all doers are actors” (Melville 
1857: 49). If this is so, then the confidence man repre-
sents the apotheosis of the essentially theatrical nature 
of the self. Maurer explains, 
confidence games are in reality only carefully re-
hearsed plays in which every member of the cast 
except the mark knows his part perfectly. … Further-
more, this drama is motivated by some fundamental 
weakness of the victim—liquor, money, women, or 
even some harmless personal crotchet. The victim is 
forced to go along with the play, speaking approxi-
mately the lines which are demanded of him; they 
spring unconsciously to his lips. … He is living in a 
fantastic, grotesque world which resembles the real 
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one so closely that he cannot distinguish the differ-
ence. (1940: 108)
It follows from this that “a con man must have a good 
deal of genuine acting ability. … He must sense imme-
diately what aspect of his personality will be most ap-
pealing to his victim, then assume that pose and hold 
it consistently” (1940: 147).
In Melville’s narrative, the confidence man’s fun-
damental amorality allows him to fold conventional 
instruments of establishing trust and accountability 
into his ploys. In an elaborate scheme to avoid paying 
the paltry price of a shave, the confidence man draws 
up a formal contract deviously requiring the ship’s 
barber to “evince a perfect confidence in all men, es-
pecially strangers” (Melville 1857: 367). Upon signing 
the contract, the barber is trapped in a self-referential 
labyrinth: the confidence man will cover him for any 
losses he might incur from trusting strangers, but the 
confidence man, who saunters off without paying, is 
the stranger whom he, contractually speaking, can’t 
mistrust.
Like a Socratic elenchus, the confidence man’s con-
versations lead victims to a state of aporia that Melville 
repeatedly compares to theatrical enchantment. The 
confidence’s man’s manner of ensnaring the barber is 
“sort of magical,” he evinces “the power of persuasive 
fascination—the power of holding another creature by 
the button of the eye” (1857: 365). This is charisma, 
telegenicity, the virtuosity of the actor. “In days af-
ter, telling of the night’s adventure to his friends, the 
worthy barber always spoke of his queer customer as 
the man-charmer—as certain East Indians are called 
snake-charmers” (1857: 371).
* * * * *
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One of the confidence man’s principal antagonists—
and eventual victims—stands out as singularly im-
portant in the conception of Melville’s allegory: the 
Missourian, Pitch,
a rather eccentric-looking person … somewhat ur-
sine in aspect; sporting a shaggy spencer of the cloth 
called bear’s-skin; a high-peaked cap of raccoon-skin, 
the long bushy tail switching over behind; raw-hide 
leggings; grim stubble chin; and to end, a double-bar-
reled gun in hand—a Missouri bachelor, a Hoosier 
gentleman, of Spartan leisure and fortune, and equal-
ly Spartan manners and sentiments. (1857: 164)
The Missourian appears when the confidence man, in 
the avatar of an herbalist, has just tricked a tubercular 
miser into buying his nostrum Omni-Balsamic Rein-
vigorator. Engaging the herbalist in a protracted argu-
ment, the Missourian initially appears to epitomize a 
frontier spirit of extreme self-reliance and mother wit: “I 
have confidence in distrust” (1857: 168), he proclaims. 
Pressed by the herbalist on the issue of slavery, the 
Missourian proves coarsely consistent in his philoso-
phy of self-reliance: “Bad enough to see whites duck-
ing and grinning around for a favor, without having 
those poor devils of niggers congeeing round for their 
corn” (1857: 174). He then issues a stinging indictment 
of the liberal-minded herbalist who, asked about ab-
olitionism, grandiloquently expounds on the abstract 
principle of human equality. “Picked and prudent sen-
timents,” the Missourian damningly responds (1857: 
175). “You are the moderate man, the invaluable un-
derstrapper of the wicked man. You, the moderate 
man, may be used for wrong, but are useless for right.”
The Missourian’s unflinching bluntness and deep 
distrust of others seem to make him impervious to the 
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herbalist’s unction, but in the next chapter the con-
fidence man returns in a new guise, the Philosophi-
cal Intelligence Officer (P.I.O.), and twists the virtue 
of self-reliance into self-delusion. “A round-baked, 
baker-kneed man, in a mean five-dollar suit” who 
“obliquely” slinks with “a sort of canine deprecation” 
(1857: 176), the P.I.O. works for an employment 
agency that hires out servant boys to gentleman cli-
ents. The Missourian, who has already told the herb-
alist that he utterly mistrusts boys, just as he mistrusts 
men, unleashes a misanthropic torrent against the pit-
eous P.I.O. “Truth is like a thrashing-machine; tender 
sensibilities must keep out of the way,” he says (1857: 
186). “I hope you understand me. Don’t want to hurt 
you. All I say is … all boys are rascals.”
Key to gulling a mark is reinforcing his “illusion 
of superiority” allowing him to “regard himself as a 
person of vision and even of genius,” Maurer writes 
(1940: 111). In providing the Missourian with a 
perfectly servile nonentity against whom to vent his 
sense of self-satisfied superiority, the P.I.O. reveals 
that, in his performativity, the confident man is also 
a kind of confidence man. Proceeding to unfurl his 
agency’s “scientific” (Melville 1857: 187) “philosophy 
of boys” (1857: 189) through a series of analogies, the 
P.I.O. does not so much convince the Missourian of 
the essential goodness of human nature as excite in 
him a thwarted and repressed optimism—that too 
being a distinctive frontier virtue. “If hitherto, sir, 
you have struck upon a peculiarly bad vein of boys, so 
much the more hope now of your hitting a good one.” 
Eventually, Pitch not only pays the P.I.O.’s three dol-
lar fee, but even volunteers extra money for his new 
boy’s transit.
Returning to his senses in the following chapter, 
the Missourian ponders how “he, the philosopher, had 
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unwittingly been betrayed into being an unphilosoph-
ical dupe” (1857: 202).
He revolves the crafty process of sociable chat, by 
which, as he fancies, the [P.I.O.] wormed into him, 
and made such a fool of him as insensibly to per-
suade him to waive, in his exceptional case, that 
general law of distrust systematically applied to the 
race. He revolves, but cannot comprehend, the oper-
ation, still less the operator. Was the man a trickster, 
it must be more for the love than the lucre. Two or 
three dirty dollars the motive to so many nice wiles? 
(1857: 202–3)
The Missourian faces what is most disturbing about 
Melville’s dark vision: what is the confidence man’s 
real motivation? Money alone seems an inadequate 
explanation for such lavish displays of ingenuity. The 
merely instrumental fake is here folded into the ritual-
istic realm of deep fakery, “world-making” fakesterism 
(cf. Hyde 1998). But what kind of world is this?
“Each society, each generation, fakes the thing it 
covets most,” writes the art historian ( Jones 1990: 13). 
If self-reliance—itself another form of confidence—is 
the paramount American virtue, then the confidence 
man enacts it like no other. One might even say that—
compared to the Missourian, for instance—he’s the real 
thing. Pursuing his simultaneously grotesque and sub-
lime activities of self-reliant, self-referential self-mak-
ing as an end in themselves, he achieves a kind of ethi-
cal and aesthetic perfection. Money is just a prop.
* * * * *
The narrative links the Missourian to what Melville 
terms “the metaphysics of Indian-hating” (1857: 224). 
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He is an example of the “backwoodsman” for whom 
“the sight of smoke ten miles off is provocation to one 
more remove from man, one step deeper into nature” 
(1857: 226). Charlie Noble explains that, such men, 
who indiscriminately kill Indians as a kind of instinc-
tive raison d’être, “seem to America what Alexander 
was to Asia—captain in the vanguard of a conquer-
ing civilization.” In the figure of the backwoodsman, 
the American ideal of self-reliance reveals its savage 
prerequisite: the expropriation of indigenous land 
and the extermination of indigenous people. Like the 
hypocritically charitable gentleman whose lily-white 
“hands retained their spotlessness” (1857: 54) despite 
the Fidèle’s soot-streaked surfaces because a “negro 
servant’s hands did most of his master’s handling for 
him” (1857: 55), the American “nation’s growing op-
ulence or power” (1857: 226) depends on the back-
woodsman’s virtually unseen wages of terror.
“The tide of emigration, let it roll as it will, never 
overwhelms the backwoodsman into itself,” Charlie 
Noble says. “He rides upon advance, as the Polynesian 
upon the comb of surf.”
But what happens when it eventually does? What 
happens to this peripheral legacy of violence when the 
tides of optimistic expansion do begin to slosh against 
the edges of possibility?
The confidence man offers one answer. He fore-
tells a “progress of genialization,” akin to “the progress 
of Christianization” (1857: 277), that will civilize and 
subdue even the most recalcitrant of misanthropes, the 
backwoodsman.
Now, the genial misanthrope, when, in the process 
of eras, he shall turn up, will … under an affable air 
… hide a misanthropical heart. In short, the genial 
misanthrope will be a new kind of monster, but still 
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no small improvement upon the original one, since, 
instead of making faces and throwing stones at peo-
ple … he will take steps, fiddle in hand, and set the 
tickled world a’ dancing.
The confidence man’s tone is hard to gauge here. Is this 
a trifle, a roundabout kind of confession, or a chilling 
prophecy? Probably it is all three at once. The telegenic 
monster he foresees may be none other than the con-
fidence man himself in a new incarnation (his avatars 
always cross-reference each other), a rearrangement of 
the culture hero’s basic characteristics in a new guise. 
His deep, perennial fakesterism represents cultural re-
production and regeneration. A striving nation that 
needs to constantly replenish its reserves of self-confi-
dence, Melville seems to be telling us, will always find 
its confidence man.
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chapter 3
Being false to oneself ?
Veena Das, Johns Hopkins University
Within the family of terms—mistakes, errors, infelic-
ity, lies, deception, superstition—all of which contest 
any notion of a stable and bounded notion of “truth”—
how might we think of being false to oneself ? I hope 
that engaging the question of lying to oneself might 
add a new dimension to the anthropological discus-
sions on fakery and deception. The possibility that 
one might lie to oneself (not about oneself ) presents 
itself as a problem of philosophical grammar and not 
one that is receptive to empirical justification or nega-
tion—much as the incongruence of a sentence such as 
“It is raining but I do not believe it” lies in the impossi-
bility of its formulation as a first-person present indic-
ative statement. The issue as Wittgenstein taught us is 
not that such a statement would break any rules of lin-
guistic grammar but that it would violate the concep-
tual normativity of the term “belief.” In Wittgenstein’s 
famous formulation, “If there were a verb meaning ‘to 
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believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first 
person present indicative” (Wittgenstein 1968: 190).
Often presented as a problem of self-deception, 
the discussion on being false to oneself clusters around 
concerns about the consequences of self-deception and 
its analogy with deception of others; epistemic is-
sues around what it is to know; or inquiries into the 
nature of the self that can be deceived by itself (see 
McLaughlin and Rorty 1988). Lurking behind these 
cluster of issues is the picture of rationality and a mod-
el of responsibility that derives its scaffolding from ju-
dicial reasoning. Though these discussions are helpful 
in raising certain issues on the asymmetry between 
first-person and third-person perspectives, they end 
up forefronting the question of agency and rational-
ity. I want to shift the emphasis from agency (e.g., is 
self-deception bad because it leads to an erosion of 
agency?)1 to questions around the fabric of our experi-
ence. Does the process of knowing oneself necessarily 
entail bringing a third-person perspective on myself ? 
Could I envisage the possibility that even documen-
tary evidence that someone might bring before me on 
my past might fail to persuade me that this or that fact 
on what I was or did, can capture my sense of myself 
in the present? The question is not just around “facts.” 
I might not contest the facts that have been produced 
before me, yet fail to see them as capturing the sense 
of who I am. From this perspective, the boundaries be-
tween being able to see facts in the world (with regard 
to third persons and second persons) and facts about 
oneself in a first-person way crosses the boundaries 
between self and the world at several points. I con-
cede that there are no straightforward answers to these 
1. See Baron (1988).
BEING FALSE TO ONESELF? 33
issues and hence I am content to see if some pathways 
could be opened to these vexed questions, rather than 
striving to give definitive answers.
There are two different paths I want to open in this 
discussion. The first opening is through Wittgenstein’s 
notion of “aspect dawning” and second through revis-
iting a well-known scene in the Shrimad Bhagavad 
Gita when Arjun, the hesitant warrior hero, stands in 
the battlefield in the grip of uncertainty about the eth-
ics of killing his own kinsmen. He is given a lesson by 
the divine charioteer Krishna about the opaqueness of 
what is before his eyes. My idea here is not so much 
to contrast a generic “Western” view with a generic 
“Indian” one, but to see how the work of time enters 
these scenes. We could, perhaps, put these scenes in a 
relation of commentaries on each other on the difficul-
ties of trust in one’s own experience. What is the status 
of truth in relation to self-knowledge when the condi-
tions under which I can claim my own experience as 
“mine” recede from me? The danger to truth-speaking 
does not always come from its opposites such as lying 
but might come from its doubles—flattery, tact, civili-
ty, and expediency (Foucault 2012). I am interested in 
the scene of truth-telling in dialogue with oneself (or 
facing the truth) within the scene of both public action 
and intimacy. I start with Wittgenstein’s scene of “as-
pect dawning” as a way of approaching how being able 
to see objects in the world one way or another might 
provide a lens with which to see oneself.
WITTGENSTEIN AND ASPECT DAWNING
While Wittgenstein’s famous example of the 
duck-rabbit picture has been read by many as allud-
ing to the economy of “seeing,” it was Stanley Cavell’s 
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genius to have shown that there is a deep connection 
between the discussion of “seeing” different aspects 
in the same picture and experiencing the same word 
through different nuances of meaning or sometimes 
as containing multiple meanings (Cavell 1979, 2010). 
The connection Cavell established between these two 
traits—“aspect blindness” and “meaning blindness”—
lay in the similarity they evoked of going about one’s 
life as if blind. But Cavell also asked if there was a dif-
ference in being blind to aspects of objects in the world 
(which kinds of objects?) and being blind to aspects of 
oneself. The comparison raised for him the insight that 
in Wittgenstein my attachment to my words serves 
as an allegory of my attachment to others. Why does 
Wittgenstein juxtapose the discussion on aspect blind-
ness in a picture with the difficulty some have with 
experiencing the meaning of a word, not just using it 
as a tool of communication?
The discussion of “aspect seeing” is announced only 
in the second part of Philosophical Investigations, and 
since the text was published posthumously, there is 
a legitimate debate in the literature on the order in 
which the paragraphs pertaining to “aspect seeing” and 
“aspect blindness” should be read (Baz 2010; Mulhall 
2010). Without engaging this debate here, I think all 
sides would agree that one important point in Witt-
genstein’s discussion is that he is not asking us to think 
of seeing something new as we move from one picture 
to another—say from the picture of the duck to an-
other picture of the rabbit. Instead, he is asking, what 
allows a different aspect of the same picture to dawn 
on us? In other related examples to that of seeing a 
picture, Wittgenstein draws our attention to hearing 
a tune as a variation of an earlier one, or experiment-
ing with saying a word to mean it otherwise (saying 
happy but meaning sad, for example). Does the fact 
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that the same written notations can be heard or played 
differently tell us something about musical experi-
ence? Does an experiment with words—saying them 
first with one expression and then with another—have 
something to do with the physiognomy of the word, 
rather than its dictionary meaning? All these exam-
ples make us think of what it is to sense something 
new when we look at something familiar, allowing a 
different aspect of a picture, or a tune, or a word, to 
dawn on us. The variety of examples Wittgenstein of-
fers shows that visual experience is only one part of 
the discussion on aspect dawning—a larger question 
is how something new might emerge from something 
familiar? The point about familiarity evokes for me a 
definite sense that what is at stake here is the kind of 
familiarity that one has with oneself or with an in-
timate another, not familiarity with some impersonal 
fact such as the train schedule. I do not deny that this 
intimacy with another might well be my intimacy with 
an affective object such as my violin or with Cantor’s 
diagonal argument and its elegance. The important 
point is that the familiarity with this other is of the 
kind in which my life is staked in this other. I hope 
to show that in such contexts the dawning of a new 
aspect might be felt as freeing or threatening precise-
ly because it hooks into my desire for and fear of my 
attachments. 
We might warn ourselves here against the temp-
tation to think that the visual is privileged by recall-
ing Wittgenstein’s repeated cautions on the dangers of 
pictures. One danger lies in our becoming captive to a 
picture that lies in our language and ensnares us—the 
second, that our projections of the same word or pic-
ture into new contexts can go wild, become groundless, 
as when Wittgenstein thinks of language going on a 
holiday or as an engine that is idling. How do these 
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observations illuminate the question of self-knowledge 
and what it might be to bear false witness to oneself ?
Much work on the first person has established that 
there is a basic asymmetry between the first person and 
second and third person (Moran 2001; Das 2015b), 
and Wittgenstein gives some unnerving examples of 
the dangers of imagining the self as (merely) one ob-
ject among others—for instance, something I might 
mislay and then find as I might mislay and find my 
glasses or my keys. So, while I do not have to examine 
myself to infer whether I am feeling pain or feigning it, 
though I might legitimately ask that of another, there 
are other aspects of myself that are not transparent to 
me. The two dangers that Wittgenstein alerts us to 
pertain conjointly to how we see the world and how 
we see ourselves. Thus, if self-knowledge requires me 
to reengage my memories to come to terms with past 
events, I might fall into the grip of a delusion because 
I project my present concerns into my past, thereby 
giving a teleological orientation to my life. This might 
be because I dare not face what I have become—or 
in the case of a related danger, I might fail to detach 
myself from the captivity of a fixed picture of myself 
(say, of what a good Hindu wife is, or predetermining 
what desires I am entitled to have given a fixed grid 
on which I expect my life to move). One’s past is not 
in the nature of a set of objectified events that one can 
simply recall: so what layers of deception might I add 
to events and how do I do that? Let us pause here to 
recapitulate the different ways in which the problem 
of self-deception or false witnessing to oneself might 
appear.
First, a dominant trend in the literature is to think 
of self-deception as a problem of false belief. Though 
the discussion in much of this literature moves around 
the question of whether self-deception can be modeled 
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on deception by others and the debate between in-
tentionalists and deflationary (nonintentionalist) ap-
proaches, the more interesting question is whether 
self-knowledge is always a question of belief in the 
first place (see Edwards 2013). As mentioned earlier, 
Wittgenstein had already shown that the verb “believe 
falsely” cannot have a subject in the first-person pres-
ent indicative tense. 
Second, the question of self-deception might be 
posed with regard to a perspective we bring on our past 
actions. Garry Hagberg (2010) gives a fascinating ac-
count of Iris Murdoch’s discussion of self-knowledge 
as a constant responsibility to move out of a frozen 
past kept in place by a picture we may have of our-
selves, to a dynamic understanding of our past words, 
deeds, and relationships, that might appear in a new 
light because of the way our present leads us to re-
contextualize our past. What Murdoch is asking for, 
he says, is not a reflection on the intrinsic properties 
of isolated events but how they stand in relation to 
the sense of our life. Here, overcoming self-deception 
would appear to be the ability to take responsibility 
for one’s past actions not simply in a mode of regret 
but also of acknowledgment. This issue might then an-
imate debates all the way from the individual to the 
collective, for example, in relation to historic wrongs 
committed by nations or Empires.
Third, self-deception might also be entailed in how 
desire comes in the way of reading the words, body, or 
gestures of an intimate other. Nothing expresses this 
region of the issue better than the phrase in Hindi in 
which the closeness and distance between dhoka diya 
(deception inflicted by another) and dhokha hua (was 
deceived by myself ) are expressed by a simple shift of 
verb. In my fieldwork among urban slum-dwellers, this 
aspect of self-deception was a constant refrain when 
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friendships were strained or when one learned in a 
one-sided love affair that one had misread what was 
concern, or pity, or even sympathy, as an expression of 
love. As one woman—asked to say what she regretted 
most in her life—said to me: “I could not then see and 
cannot still see if I was the one who deceived myself 
(mujhe dhoka hua) or if he had deceived me (dhoka 
diya), allowing me to think he loved me by his gestures 
and words.” Here one touches on the physiognomy of 
words, and the experience of meaning that may go be-
yond the communicative function of words.
Fourth, and for me the most lethal form of self- 
deception, is the “moral blindness” that Cavell iden-
tifies with aspect blindness. The example that Cavell 
privileges in his discussion is Cora Diamond’s discus-
sion of the story by J. M. Coetzee of Mrs. Costello, an 
aging professor whose experience of the indifference 
her fellow humans bear toward the suffering of an-
imals leaves her wounded—a wound I cover up, she 
says, under my clothes, but which is revealed in literal-
ly every word she says. Cavell takes this as an example 
of the “difficulty of reality,” in which Mrs. Costello is 
overcome, mortally wounded, by the cruelty to ani-
mals processed in food factories, while for others these 
events are just passed over without turning a hair. In 
the course of a lecture, Mrs. Costello compares the 
cruelty to animals with the cruelty of Nazi camps, cre-
ating outrage in her listeners that she is fully aware of 
causing. While I cannot go into the full geography of 
the argument here, what I note is the importance of 
the issue that Mrs. Costello finds difficult to compre-
hend—viz. that one could be so blind to the suffering 
of human and nonhuman animals with whom one 
inhabits a milieu. Cavell calls this “soul-blindness” at 
one point (Cavell 2007: 281), although he complicates 
the issue by asking what might be lines of difference 
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in acknowledging the overwhelming knowledge of 
Nazi camps versus animal processing factories, and 
further, what is our culpability with regard to them? 
For instance, “aspect dawning” might make us take 
a different angle in seeing our actions (or inactions) 
with regard to cruelty or suffering. Earlier, we might 
have regarded those facts in our world as somehow 
not connected to us. Then a new aspect of our culpa-
bility might dawn on us.
Yet, as Cavell says, failing to see the duck and re-
maining stuck on the rabbit in the duck-rabbit picture 
is not comparable to remaining indifferent or feigning 
indifference to cruelty, or abuse, or violence as if it were 
an unremarkable fact of life. What kind of selfhood 
would have to be actively cultivated, or senses trained, 
in order to make oneself blind to this aspect of life? I 
take two examples from my field notes to show how 
words can bear false witness to the sense of a life lived 
with others and hence also to oneself.
A woman from a middle-class family, married to 
an army officer, would sometimes disappear within the 
house for days and then turn up with bruises that she 
attributed to domestic accidents. Yet it was obvious to 
everyone in her neighborhood that her husband was 
beating her, sometimes mercilessly, in fits of rage. Her 
daughter once said to me in despair—“we go to vis-
it relatives—they serve tea and snacks—we eat—we 
all laugh and chat—end of evening—goodbyes—see 
you soon—yet everyone knows when we reach home 
my mother will be beaten up—why does no one con-
front my father?” [Rishtedaron ke ghar jaate hain—vo 
chai dete hain—pakode samne rakhte hain—hum sab 
haste hain—gappe lagate hain—sham dhali- chalo bye, 
phir jaldi milenge—sab ko pata hota hai ke jab ghar pa-
huchenge to mammi ko zordar maar padegi—mere papa 
ko koi kuch kehta kyon nahin?]
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In discussing such situations in a focus group 
discussion, I found that when presented with an eth-
nographic vignette in which a scene is described, mod-
eled on this case, most people said that men would 
be hesitant to confront the husband because he might 
immediately turn around and say—“Why are you in-
terested? Are you having an affair with my wife? Who 
is she to you?” Women said it would be opening your-
self to being insulted, for, such a violent man could 
easily resort to abusive insults (gali galauj), uttering 
words not fit for a respectable woman’s ears. The most 
suitable action they could think of was to inform the 
relatives if they were friendly with the household or 
to limit interactions with them. Calling in the police 
was out of the question, because everyone knew that 
the police would either simply extort a bribe from the 
husband or might even side with the husband, sowing 
more seeds of disruption in the fragile harmony of the 
neighborhood. Of course, this discussion was of a hy-
pothetical case. Actual cases of domestic violence in 
the neighborhoods I have studied sometimes do end 
up in police stations or courts of law. However, there 
are thin lines between action and inaction, so that 
neighbors are not so much indifferent to the violence 
as ineffectual because of the constraints of context.
The second case I describe is probably closer to the 
kind of issue relating to inordinate or overwhelming 
knowledge that Cavell and Diamond clearly struggle 
with in their writing. This is a case I have discussed 
elsewhere (Das 2015a) of a woman whose mother had 
said on her deathbed to her—“you have a lot to forgive 
me for.” Even when she described this event years later, 
she had said to me—“ye zulm tha,” “this was cruel”—
and I asked myself, Why was a plea for forgiveness 
experienced as cruelty? For this woman, who as a child 
had borne in silence the sexual abuse of an uncle in 
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whose house her mother and she had lived as depend-
ent relatives, this plea put into words had been more 
unbearable than years of silence on the part of her 
mother. It brought to light for her a new knowledge, 
viz. that her mother had always known that her child 
was being abused by her (the mother’s) brother, but 
she had carried on as if nothing was happening. Yet 
how could she not know? The cruelty, as this woman 
described it, lay in the fact that her mother could even 
imagine that she could utter these words of apology at 
her death bed and they would be sufficient currency to 
buy peace among them. How did her mother imagine 
that this daughter could be so easily freed from her 
memories of a house in which every corner had car-
ried lurking dangers from her uncle? Then there was 
further double-bind of not knowing how or whom to 
forgive. She could not understand, she said, what kind 
of woman she had become now—one who could just 
say to her mother, “yes, I forgive you,” and then expect 
a whole lifetime of rage to be wiped out as if it were 
a mark on a slate? Or, could she say “no, I cannot for-
give you,” and live with the knowledge that she could 
not bring herself to forgive a dying woman? Some-
how the idea that this was an aspect of her selfhood 
that dawned on her on the deathbed of her mother 
is inadequate if we think of the pictorial image of the 
duck-rabbit. But if we shift to Wittgenstein’s analogy 
that the issue is the depth in which words reveal or 
conceal the wound she is carrying, then it makes sense 
to see that truth or falsity in relation to one’s life goes 
beyond the family of terms such as error, mistake, or 
superstition that I started with. Rather, it becomes a 
question of rethinking entirely such moments in re-
lation to how one is going to bear a certain kind of 
knowledge of what it is to live with others through 
falsity and truth. 
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KRISHNA’S COSMIC FORM
While I am not able to develop a full-fledged argu-
ment here on the issue of self-knowledge from the 
perspective of certain strands in Indian thought, I 
want to indicate the possibility of a different route to 
these issues through a reading of one episode in the 
Srimad Bhagavad Gita, the canonical text on detach-
ment as a mode of action in Indian philosophy. This 
text continues to receive attention for its relevance 
to different kinds of political issues—for instance, 
the dialogue between Krishna and Arjuna has been 
recast as the debate between a thick consequentialist 
(Arjuna) and a proponent of deontological reasoning 
(Krishna) by Amartya Sen in his influential book on 
the idea of justice (Sen 2009). There is also a rich de-
bate in India on whether Arjuna simply lost his nerve 
on the battlefield, and whether his anguish came from 
concern for his kin or simply the fear of incurring sin 
(see Anderson 2012). Unlike Anderson, though, I don’t 
think that the important issue is to decide whether 
the Srimad Bhagavad Gita is a religious text or a sec-
ular one2—my main concern is that by placing labels 
such as consequentialist versus deontologist, these 
attempts at comparison fall into the trap of reading 
2. Already, influential scholars of Indian philosophy 
have put forward vigorous arguments against thinking 
that philosophical themes in Indian texts are purely 
functional to religious ideals (Daya Krishna 1991a, 
1991b). Thus, it is irrelevant whether this is a religious 
text applied to philosophy or a philosophical text using 
religious vocabulary. These debates are not innocent, as 
Hegel’s dismissal of the Bhagavad Gita as a religious 
text rather than a philosophical one shows (see Spivak 
1999).
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what were major issues (say on the nature of action 
[Freschi 2010], or relationality versus solitude of the 
self [Mukerjee 1971]) as if these were early premoni-
tions of theories that were to be more fully developed 
by Western theorists.3
The main plot of the Mahabharata is well known 
and I will only allude to one specific scene pertain-
ing to the hesitation of Arjuna and Krishna’s response 
to it. Seated on his chariot with Krishna as the char-
ioteer, Arjuna is confronted with the sight of the two 
armies arrayed against each other in readiness for the 
war about to be waged. Arjuna is suddenly overcome 
with doubt that the war, however just, is against his 
own people—cousins with whom he played as a child, 
uncles, teachers—each name, as he recites it, brings a 
region of the past into the present moment. Krishna 
then shows him his cosmic form as a way of taking 
away the hold of the present moment for Arjuna, who 
now sees the present moment or the phenomenologi-
cal moment as being eaten up by Krishna in his cosmic 
form. In Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s (1999: 37–67) 
profound reading, “Being is being-eaten. The graph of 
Time is devouring of time as timing” (1999: 55). She 
goes on to say that the human agent in his present-in-
time (in the here and now) can no longer trust the here 
and now as the concrete ground of verifiability. Leav-
ing aside the other threads of this argument, I want 
to simply point out that the image of being eaten by 
time, mistaking what is static and what moves (it is not 
time that is passing but we who are passing away, says 
3. My argument is not that one cannot use such 
designations to express concerns that run through 
the debates in classical Indian philosophy, but that, in 
making these translations, what were issues of concern, 
say, to the Mimamsa scholars, are completely eclipsed. 
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Bhartrihari) shows, among other things, the delusional 
character of what we take to be our experience. If de-
lusion is the primitive condition of our being, then the 
question for the philosophers might have been, How 
might we bring a different vision of the self to bear 
on ourselves? Krishna might appear as the impersonal 
spectator in the scene at the battlefield, but when he 
has to face Gandhari, the queen who is mourning the 
death of all her children and who tells him “you could 
have stopped the war,” the ideal of detachment is con-
siderably dimmed. In the play, Andha Yug, we can hear 
her rage against Krishna as cited in Das (2012):4
 What have you done Krishna! What have you 
done!
 If you wanted … You could have stopped the war…
 You may be a god … You may be omnipotent
 Whoever you are…
 I curse you and I curse all your kinsmen.
Krishna accepts the curse, which then leads to the 
complete extinction of his lineage while he himself is 
killed like a wild animal in his old age. What is haunt-
ing, though, is the depiction of what Krishna has taken 
upon himself in this terrible war. He says:
 In this terrible war of eighteen days, 
 I am the only one who died a million times.
 Every time a soldier was struck down, 
 Every time a soldier fell on the ground.
 It was I who was struck down, 
 It was I who was wounded,
 It was I who fell to the ground.
4. See Das (2012) for a fuller discussion.
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The prince who has been able to make war due to this 
education he receives from Krishna, his divine teacher, 
must in the end ask himself what it is to live within 
the time of human error or illusion (maya)—the reality 
of the affect here and now asserts itself in the vision 
of the grieving wives of the dead warriors, his aunts, 
his surrogate mothers. In the end, I think that aspect 
blindness does not quite do the work that contemplat-
ing the grip of blindness to which Arjuna has been 
subjected asks us to do. The rendering of the dialogue 
between Arjuna and Krishna as simply rational argu-
mentation (as in Sen and Anderson) does not work 
because they assume that arguments come to an end 
at this point, but the text shows us that they do not. 
The horrors that one comes to live with and tolerate—
horrors such as Arjuna experienced at the thought of 
killing his kinsmen—do not get settled by arguments 
alone. The falsities of the kind that ensnare us, much 
like skepticism, cannot be overcome in one decisive 
moment but the flashes of recognition of how we 
deceive ourselves could be put into continuous work, 
of which aspect dawning (versus aspect blindness) is 
one modality; the restoration of the everyday (versus 
the desire to escape from it) is another; and the desire 
to acknowledge our connectedness versus the desire 
for solitude—for all give and take to be over—is yet 
another. Self-knowledge and self-delusion take their 
place within these kinds of tempos and not outside 
them. 
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Fake as knowledge and 
relationship 
Carlo Severi, EHESS, Paris
In his Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein writes that a good theory of mag-
ic should “preserve its depth,” not simply condemn 
it as a mistake from the point of view of rationality. 
This “cancelling of magic”—he adds immediate-
ly after—would “have the character of magic itself ” 
(Wittgenstein [1967] 1979: 1). Wittgenstein captures 
here one of the more deeply rooted ambitions of social 
anthropology: to reach a rational understanding of the 
forms of thought that we find enacted in ethnography. 
But he also adds that a simple refutation, from a ra-
tional point of view, would not be a way to make the 
effects of magic disappear. Maybe there is here a useful 
analogy with fakery. We all know that to prove that a 
statement made by a “fake” enunciator is not true, has, 
very often, no efficacy. A certain kind of untruthful-
ness seems, on the contrary, inherent to the success of 
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this kind of message. Let us take only one example, 
among many others, drawn from contemporary pol-
itics. Geoffrey Kabaservice, a political historian, has 
recently remarked that: “President Trump has trium-
phantly succeeded in turning politics into spectacle, 
transforming the complicated process of government 
into something more like a made-for-TV drama. A lot 
of his supporters care more about the fight than the re-
sults, and the sense that the whole production is faked 
only adds to their enjoyment” (2017: 23). 
Kabaservice adds several examples of these self-ev-
ident “obvious falsehoods” where a certain sense of 
fakeness did not prevent people believing in them. 
For instance, he writes that “many American far-right 
groups in the 1950s maintained that President Dwight 
Eisenhower, a Republican, was a dedicated, conscious 
agent of a Communist conspiracy. ... Other groups de-
clared that the United Nations was training African 
cannibals in Georgia for an armed takeover of the 
United States, or that a committee of the University 
of Chicago eggheads was rewriting the Constitution 
to deprive Americans of their right to vote” (2017: 23). 
A list of examples of this kind could become rapidly 
endless. They all tell the same story: in order to un-
derstand fakery, we have to understand the manner it 
has—to use again Wittgenstein’s words, to “preserve 
its depth”—and, therefore, to resist refutation. We 
won’t understand fakeness without understanding its 
magic.
Before trying to formulate an explanation of this 
kind of magic, and appreciate the kind of communi-
cation (and knowledge) it typically conveys, let me 
describe, very briefly, the point of view I am adopting 
here. My starting point is that people share interest-
ing forms of communication that are not easily pre-
dictable from a purely theoretical point of view. Like 
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other anthropologists interested in the anthropology 
of communication, I have tried to study some exam-
ples of these special communicative contexts in cultur-
al transmission. Of course, it is impossible to refer here 
to the details of these analyses (see, for instance, Severi 
2004, 2014, 2015). But the main idea can be formu-
lated briefly. My attempt has been (and still is) to for-
mulate a Pragmatics that would prove able to account 
for the kind of complexity that characterizes cultural 
communication, in terms of the mobilization of verbal 
and nonverbal means of expression, and in terms of the 
definition of a special “deictic field” (in Karl Bühler’s 
sense; Bühler 1990), which defines the “I,” the “Here,” 
and the “Now,” of a given utterance. This means that, 
if one chooses this perspective, two levels of commu-
nication should be explored: one is the generation of 
meaning through the use of language, and the other is 
the kind of communicative interaction in which this 
meaning is conveyed. Nothing can be done, in this 
field of analysis, without fieldwork. 
My second point is theoretical. Dan Sperber has 
formulated two both influential and controversial 
theories. One concerns the role of relevance (defined, 
in Paul Grice’s terms [1991], as the research of the 
speaker’s intentions in order to understand the mean-
ing of a sentence) in verbal and nonverbal communi-
cation (Sperber and Wilson 1986). The other concerns 
the many ways representations propagate in a society 
and the possible redefinition of social anthropology as 
an epidemiology of ideas (Sperber 1985). Since their 
first formulation, both theories have been variously 
discussed and developed. Both have advantages and 
disadvantages, and both may be criticized or praised 
for many reasons. 
Still, it seems to me remarkable that no one has 
attempted to identify a possible relationship between 
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these two theories. What we probably need most to-
day is precisely to find the point of articulation of two 
points of view, one focused on the microanalysis of sin-
gle statements (verbal or nonverbal), the other focused 
on the study of the dynamics and structures of contexts 
of communication. In short, we should become able to 
tell how specific forms of conversational exchange (or 
specific forms of verbal and nonverbal communication, 
requiring a special pragmatics) generate specific kinds 
of propagation of representations in a given society. 
There lies, I think, the main problem that an anthropo-
logical theory of cultural communication should solve. 
The study of fake communication could be an in-
teresting test case for this new approach. What kind of 
knowledge is fake knowledge? How is it propagated, 
and how does it acquire the semblance of truth? What 
kind of relationship between speaker and addressees 
underlies fake communication? In this very brief inter-
vention, and using Wittgenstein’s remarks about magic 
and its “depth,” I would like to offer an answer to these 
questions. Let us start from a dictionary definition. If 
we look, for instance, at the Oxford Dictionary, we find 
that “to fake is to alter as to deceive, to feign in order 
to make something presentable or plausible.” 
There are two aspects in this definition. One is 
propositional and organized around the opposition be-
tween true and untrue. From this point of view, to fake, 
as a verb, means “to make plausible what is untrue.” 
However, to fully understand this concept, we need to 
adopt a further perspective, and look at this concept 
from a relational point of view, in order to understand 
what kind of communication game (Airenti 2010) 
is played when one makes such an attempt. In order 
to sketch in a first idea of what the structure of “fake 
communication” might be, let us compare it with a sit-
uation we anthropologists are familiar with: a dialogue 
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with one of our interlocutors, as it might happen dur-
ing fieldwork. Six points might be relevant here. 
1. Anthropological knowledge is (or should be) al-
ways generated by a very specific kind of encoun-
ter, which we call fieldwork. Fieldwork is a rather 
vague term for designating a variable and complex 
situation, but it always requires the establishment 
of an ethic of the relationship. A link (and a certain 
commitment to truth) has to be established, both 
on the side of the anthropologist and on the side of 
her/his interlocutors. 
2. This relational ethics does not coincide with the 
concept of “truth,” in the logical sense of the term. 
Fiction, false (sometime even meaningless) state-
ments like “white lies” (or even partial truths) are 
always to be found in our dialogues with the people 
we pretend to study. Sometimes, they might even 
be required by the situation as essential elements 
in a process of mutual construction of meaning. 
Enunciating, explicitly or implicitly, a “white lie” in 
the right moment can be a way for strengthening 
a relationship, not necessarily a way to threaten it. 
When I am invited to share a glass of water with 
a friend in a village where the water comes from 
an unsafe source, I would naturally pretend that 
the water is safe—even if I am (and, very probably, 
both of us are) perfectly aware that it is not. To af-
firm the truth, in this case, would be entirely inap-
propriate. This seemingly minor point is essential. 
I would argue that where and when ethnography 
can pretend to a certain kind of reliability, it is pre-
cisely because a common commitment to truth of 
this kind (constantly renegotiated, and constantly 
assuming stable or unstable, conflictive or peaceful 
forms) has been established. 
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3. It is important to note that this is the case even 
when the people we work with adopt various 
forms of “serious fiction” (Bateson 1972), framed 
for instance in statements like “this is what we see, 
or what we believe, or what we do when we per-
form a ritual, or we tell a story.” These forms do 
not contradict the common commitment to truth 
that governs fieldwork on both sides. In these cases 
too, where the notions of “truth” and “falsehood” 
become obviously less useful, the sincerity of the 
relationship is a precondition of any interpretation 
of what is communicated, and replaces the com-
mitment to the literal “truth” of the words spoken. 
Let us provide a very brief example, drawn from 
the beautiful description Milan Stanek (1983) 
and Florence Weiss (1981, 1987) have given of 
the Naven (a ritual famously studied by Gregory 
Bateson in the 1930s) as it was celebrated in the 
early 1970s, in the Iatmul village of Palimbei 
(Papua New Guinea). 
Seeing that her son was trying out the an-
thropologist’s motor boat for the first time, 
the mother slowly began dancing in the gar-
den where she was tending her plants. She 
exclaimed: “My son! It’s you, my ancestor!” The 
boat sped over the water, arching over the 
waves of the river. The mother took a yam 
as an ornament: a symbol of her clan (and 
showed it to the boy). (Stanek 1983: 158) 
 Is the statement “My son, you are my ancestor!” 
true or false? Stanek (1983), and Bateson (1936) 
before him, have shown that this kind of question 
may rapidly become irrelevant to the understand-
ing of what the mother was saying. To put it briefly, 
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the task of the anthropologist here is to show that 
this specific utterance does not work as a descrip-
tion of the world but rather as a verbal mask of 
the speaker. Reversing the role of the mother, who 
paradoxically defines herself as the “daughter” of 
her son, this utterance manifests the transforma-
tion of the speaker and of the addressee, through a 
sequence of ritual identifications, where the moth-
er imitates her ancestor’s behavior while identi-
fying him with her son (Stanek 1983: 158). The 
enunciation of this statement ritually transforms 
the relationship between son and mother in a very 
significant way (Houseman and Severi 1998). In 
order to understand this kind of communication, 
the anthropologist has to show that behind an ap-
parently meaningless statement, there is a crucial 
signal concerning the kind of paradoxical link that 
is established, in this ritual, between mother and 
son. The kind of truth the ethnographer can offer, 
even when it concerns “serious fiction,” is founded 
upon an experimental commitment to truth that 
concerns a relationship between persons, not an 
abstract concept of truth or falsehood.
4. This distinction between the meaning of a state-
ment and the kind of interaction that it enacts 
may become methodologically useful when we try 
to answer the questions I have posed about fake 
knowledge. Fake knowledge is actually very often 
factually false, but it is only partially composed of 
untrue statements. It has also an intrinsic relation-
al nature. To be fake is not only “telling lies.” It is 
to be disloyal to the ethic of the relationship. A 
faker is not only “wrong” because usually he or she 
“does not tell the truth.” S/he is someone who tries 
“to make presentable” not only false statements 
(as the Oxford Dictionary says), but also a biased 
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relationship. Maybe a first aspect of the “magical 
power” of fakery (what Wittgenstein would have 
called “its depth”) lies in the concealment of this 
fact. 
  Pure concealment, however, is too weak a con-
cept for understanding the remarkable efficacy of 
fakers. Let me offer another reason, still formulated 
from a relational point of view: fakers are effective 
not (only) because of what they say but because 
they have specific ways to elaborate the image of 
the speaker. Their power lies in the construction of 
a certain kind of identity. 
5. Let us try to better understand this point. A fa-
miliar situation in which a “special” identity of the 
speaker is produced is a theatrical performance, 
and, actually many attempts have been made to 
understand fakery as a sort of theatrical fiction. I 
think that this analogy has to be qualified. Sup-
pose, for example, that in a performance of Chris-
topher Marlowe’s magnificent Tamburlaine the 
Great ([1590] 1950), an actor playing the role of 
the cruel emperor declaims the following verses:
  I hold the Fates bound fast in iron chains 
  And with my hands turn Fortune’s wheel about, 
  And sooner shall the sun fall from his sphere 
  Than Tamburlaine be slain or overcome. 
  Draw forth thy sword, thou mighty man-at-arms, 
  Intending but to raze my charmed skin 
  And Jove himself will stretch his hand from heaven 
  To ward the blow and shield me safe from harm.
   (Marlowe [1590] 1950, Tamburlaine: act 1, 
scene 2)
 Given that, by definition, the public considers that 
the actor is just playing the role of Tamburlaine, 
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the identities of the emperor and the actor are 
clearly distinct and mutually exclusive. The actor, 
the image of the character who appears on stage, 
may be identified either as “Tamburlaine the em-
peror” while he expresses his defiance, or else as 
Mr. X, the famous Elizabethan actor. The emo-
tions and thoughts that he expresses, and even 
some of his physical features such as the charmed 
skin that he claims to possess, are, naturally, at-
tributed to the emperor, not to the person inter-
preting the role of Tamburlaine. In the theater, 
those two identities are bound to alternate, be-
cause the context allows no confusion and keeps 
them in a relationship of reciprocal exclusion. 
When I believe in Tamburlaine, and I see him on 
stage, I do not recognize the actor, and vice versa. 
The perlocutionary effect of this situation is clear: 
during even the most successful interpretation 
of the dramatic character, no confusion as to the 
identity of the actor on stage is possible, for when 
we enter the theater, we accept without difficul-
ty the type of relationship to the fiction that this 
kind of representation implies. 
  The problem with the faker (and the difference 
with the theatrical situation) is that, in the image of 
the faker these identities are blurred by the confu-
sion operated between the propositionally defined 
(semantic) identity of the faker and the kind of re-
lational play he or she is playing. Thus, what seems 
typical of faking is, on the one hand, the hiding of 
one’s real identity, and on the other, a certain way 
of giving the interlocutor the impression that he or 
she is very similar to the listener—and thus worthy 
of their trust. 
  How does this sense of familiarity emerge? 
There is an obvious way to achieve it, and we have 
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already seen it used (as in our Trump example) in 
politics or in entertainment: to adopt the mask 
of a “common believer.” This process is relatively 
simple: all kinds of extravagant rumor (like the 
one quoted by Kabaservice [2017] about African 
cannibals being trained in Georgia) are circulating 
all the time in our societies. Many people believe 
in them. In order to capture the trust of the al-
ready-believers, you can simply repeat the rumors 
they believe in. By this simple act of “giving voice” 
to these rumors, you will achieve two effects: the 
first is that your “real” identity will be “blurred” into 
the collective community of the “already-believers.” 
The second effect is that you will acquire the ap-
pearance of being “similar” to the believers. You be-
come almost automatically “one of them” because 
you share the same belief. The simple repetition of 
a rumor triggers a sort of mimesis between speaker 
and addressee that partially accounts for the effec-
tiveness of the fake message. 
6. This type of intentional mimesis, very common in 
entertainment, is just a superficial effect of a deeper 
phenomenon. In order to describe it, we can use 
another analogy. In his essay on marionettes, the 
German writer Heinrich von Kleist ([1810] 1994) 
observed that to “give life” to the puppet, the pup-
peteer executes an extremely simple gesture, which 
does not have a direct, immediate relationship with 
the movements the doll will then be able to make. 
The attitudes, leaps, bounds, attacks, and fights 
that give an illusion of life and dominate the fig-
ure’s behavior certainly depend on a balancing of 
weight and counterweight of the puppet’s different 
body parts. But they also depend on numerous acts 
of projection on the spectator’s part, which trans-
form the physical gestures and positions of the 
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puppet into the “states of mind” attributed to it: 
anger or love, hesitation or enthusiasm, aggression 
or friendship. Only then will the puppet be seen 
as alive. Indeed, the puppet has an internal mech-
anism that presides over its function and specific 
iconographical identity. But it is incontestable that 
the thoughts such a mechanism provokes (in a way 
that often surpasses the will of the puppeteer) are 
also to be included in the puppet’s constitution. 
One could say that a puppet, when perceived as 
alive, is the product of a cooperation between the 
puppeteer and the viewer. The living artifact is a 
creation of their interaction. 
  The image of the fake speaker evidently works 
in a similar way. We may conclude that a belief 
is shared (and thus, easily propagated) not when 
its content is true or false, but when the message 
conveying it is coconstructed by the enunciator 
and her/his addressees. The same holds true for the 
identity of the faker. The complexity and success 
of the “fake behavior” are thus explained by three 
factors: the meaning of what is said, the commu-
nicational structure that links the speaker and her/
his addressees, and finally the co-construction of 
the identity of the image of the speaker. Maybe 
the “magic” that enables fake communication, in 
Wittgenstein’s words, “to preserve its depth” even 
against fact-checking and propositional truth, lies 
in the conjunction of these three factors.
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Exposing fakes, debunking fakes, revealing fakes; 
but also, a class of nouns: Exposing-fakes, debunk-
ing-fakes, revealing-fakes; that is to say, fakes may 
be exposed, but also expose; they may be debunked, 
but also debunk; both distort truth, and reveal it. As 
Marcus Boon puts it, “Deceptive action aims at a tem-
porary advantage, which may end with exposure, but 
which may also be sustained by further lies. The copy 
rests within this web of deception, yet it is equally 
available to those who pursue the truth” (2010: 128). 
Hoaxes, in particular, and as is well known, frequently 
lie in order to tell the truth (Fleming and O’Carroll 
2010: 58)—at least, that is what the moralizing hoax-
er claims. But what will be revealed? Quite possibly, 
further obscurations. Will the duped be persuaded? 
Their investment in the deception might preclude this; 
perhaps they already knew but didn’t care, complicit, 
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perhaps, with the fraudster in the seductive mutual 
knowledge of falsehood (the lies they were told being, 
so to speak, their lies; Jacobson 2017: 72, 110). 
Art critics and historians have argued that expos-
ing fakes in the form of artwork forgeries is necessary 
in order to preserve an accurate understanding of 
past societies (Gamble 2002): “Forgery is not a vic-
timless crime, even if the forger is successful and ‘no 
one knows.’ For the real victim is then our general un-
derstanding of the history of art and of human vision” 
(Dutton 1998). A public good, knowledge is protect-
ed through the work of exposé. Though the argument 
makes sense from the art historian’s point of view, such 
a perspective apparently discounts the work of exposé 
as itself a possible object of knowledge, whose forms 
might be similarly subjected to historical and social 
analysis. I offer a preliminary sketch of several modes 
and logics of the exposé of fakes, which must include 
revelations of truth and knowledge precipitated by 
fakes themselves. 
LOGICS OF EXPOSÉ
Nowadays, in anthropology and adjacent disciplines, 
projects of exposé and debunking usually (though cer-
tainly not always1) receive a bad press. This was not 
1. Most strikingly, they do not receive bad press when their 
object is secularity itself. For instance, the secularity of 
anthropology has by now been exposed or unmasked 
as essentially theological in essence a few times over 
(e.g., Herbert 1991; Asad 1993; Sahlins 1996). By 
no means always dismissive in tone, such accounts 
have nonetheless served a debunking role, and have 
contributed to a suspicion of the secular that prepared 
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always the case: as E. B. Tylor (1871: 410) memorably 
put it, “the science of culture is essentially a reformer’s 
science,” and the task of the anthropologist is to “ex-
pose the remains of crude old culture which has passed 
into harmful superstition, and to mark these out for 
destruction.” More recently, exposing the shakiness of 
claims to authenticity made on behalf of pernicious 
forms of nationalism and tradition was, and sometimes 
still is, seen to be politically necessary. Richard Han-
dler’s (1988) elegantly “destructive” ethnography of 
Quebecois nationalism is exemplary here. Meanwhile, 
in places marked by notorious injustices, the work of 
exposing human rights abuses can seem like the only 
appropriate response. Robert Gordon and Andrew 
Spiegel (1993) described how many ethnographies 
produced during apartheid-era South Africa, animated 
by a sense of moral outrage, constituted a distinct gen-
re of ethnographic writing: that of “exposé anthropol-
ogy.” The edited collection The Invention of Tradition 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983), which “exposed” the 
frequently recent provenance of cultural traditions oth-
erwise portrayed as historically rooted and authentic, is 
the most prominent reference point of all here. How-
ever, as Nicholas Thomas (2002: 415) explains, if “the 
‘debunking’ style of this criticism was initially refresh-
ing,” it soon became clear that “such arguments relied 
in some cases upon the same notions of ‘authenticity’ 
that they might overtly disavow, and presumed the 
unique validity of Western ways of knowing the past, 
effectively discounting local historical understandings.” 
Especially in anthropology, whose practitioners “are 
the ground for recent anthro-theological interest in far 
more antagonistic readings of secularity as a fraudulent 
Christian masquerade (see Hagström forthcoming; 
Copeman and Hagström 2018).
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expected to take a charitable line on the deeply held 
convictions of the people they write about” (Spencer 
2002: 592), projects of exposé can provoke considera-
ble discomfort. While exposing cases of corruption or 
injustice is not, of course, the same as exposing the (re)
invention of traditions, the analyst in each case grants 
him or herself the privileged stance of unveiler.
If, in anthropology at least, there is now broad 
agreement about the reductiveness of “the ‘debunking’ 
style of criticism,” the matter is still not closed. Pro-
ponents of “the ontological turn,” for instance, define 
their approach partly in opposition to a tradition of 
sociological critique, which, “in skeptically debunking 
all ontological projects to reveal their insidiously po-
litical nature, ends up affirming the critical politics of 
debunking as its own version of how things should be” 
(Holbraad, Pedersen, and Viveiros de Castro 2014). 
Ontological politics is different, its proponents ex-
plain, involving instead “the non-skeptical elicitation 
of [the] manifold of potentials for how things could be” 
(Holbraad, Pedersen, and Viveiros de Castro 2014). 
The difference between the “should” of debunking and 
the non-normative “could” of ontological politics is all 
important. Bruno Latour similarly considers scholar-
ly debunking a practice of “critical barbarity” (2004: 
240). The enlightenment concern with matters of fact, 
he suggests, was “excellent for debunking quite a lot 
of beliefs, powers, and illusions” (2004: 232). Yet this 
concern was “totally disarmed once matters of fact, in 
turn, were eaten up by the same debunking impetus” 
(2004: 232). It is by way of Latour proposing instead a 
critical focus on “matters of concern” that he, by obvi-
ation, provides an interesting definition of the logic of 
exposé as the impulse toward subtractive antifetishism. 
“Antifetishistic” because debunking requires lifting 
“the rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers” 
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as a means of undoing the “false relational projec-
tions” imposed by “culture” on top of objective reality 
(“nature”) (Harman 2010: 75). “Subtractive” because it 
deducts reality from matters of fact, rather than add-
ing to them (Harman 2010). In contrast to a debunk-
ing that eats itself, to approach matters of concern is 
to protect and to care for the phenomena described. 
Following from this, the kind of critic Latour appeals 
for “is not the one who debunks, but the one who as-
sembles.” If something is constructed (invented), says 
Latour, “then it means it is fragile and thus in great 
need of care and caution” (2004: 246).
Attractive though Latour’s phraseology is, the ar-
gument doesn’t particularly move us forward: should 
we really be nurturing and caring for, say, the national-
isms and attendant violences destructively analyzed by 
Handler and others? The argument is also, so to speak, 
somewhat subtractive. A problem with the word “sub-
traction” is that it risks directing our imagination to 
a negative project of eliminating or removing some-
thing, when one should leave open the possibility that 
such movements (because they frequently do) first re-
quire a positive or productive epistemological opera-
tion that enables the “subtraction”; viz., before specific 
phenomena can be perceived as “fetishes,” a source do-
main of the “fetish” must be created that makes possi-
ble this perception in the first place—or they may be 
the same conjoined movement, such that to dispose of 
a fetish is simultaneously to elaborate the category of 
“fetishes” (see Jones 2010 on source domains). Might 
debunking in fact operate as a positive precursor to 
the creative birth of new forms? Might debunking 
itself take on diverse and creative forms? This is not 
the place to attempt full answers to these questions, 
but the remainder of the piece might at least begin to 
show that the primary value of Latour’s argument lies 
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more in the elegance of its exposition and provision 
of useful vocabulary than its soundness. My purpose, 
it should be clear, lies not in advancing projects of ex-
posé but in seeking a richer understanding of them.2 
In sketching the contours of a “critical politics 
of debunking” (Holbraad, Pedersen, and Viveiros de 
Castro 2014) in an ever-enlarging fakescape, it quick-
ly becomes apparent that debunking and exposé take 
on a bewildering array of forms, but also that disci-
plinary resources abound for analyzing them. Most 
obviously, such an exercise might draw inspiration 
from recent attempts to delineate an anthropology 
of critique (Boland 2013), meditations on the nature 
of evidence and production of truth (Engelke 2008; 
Kelly and McGoey 2018), and studies of the ethics of 
deconstruction (Siebers 1988). Work on the “render-
ing visible” of audit and accountability practices is also 
of relevance, especially the apparent paradox (framed 
by Peter Pels) of how “the stated goal of making the 
inner workings of organizations more visible goes to-
gether with a positioning of the audit process itself as 
an increasingly private and invisible expert activity” 
(Pels 2000: 142). Of a piece with William Mazzarella’s 
(2006: 476) more general reflection concerning how 
new transparency measures tend to produce new opac-
ities, Pels’s observation helpfully avoids denuding the 
work of exposure of its inner intricacies. But, of course, 
while audit and unveiling share a purpose in render-
ing fraud, corruption, malpractice, and so on available 
for inspection, their characteristic temporalities starkly 
2. An undertaking in some ways adjacent to Luc 
Boltanski’s (2010: 46) shift toward developing a 
“sociology of critique,” i.e., “a descriptive, sociological 
analysis of critique in rather than of society” (Larsen 
2011: 41).
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diverge: if the former makes visible through methodi-
cal routine, the latter draws a large measure of its pow-
er from the drama of the particular instant of exposure. 
Such an instant is analogous with, or perhaps a mode 
of, the moment of anagnorisis in narrative;3 viz. con-
cluding scenes of revelation and recognition that are as 
conspicuous in the works of Agatha Christie as in the 
plays of ancient Greece. 
Clearly, recognition of truths need not be at all the 
same thing as debunking fakes—even if the latter may 
be intended to lead its audience to the former. The key 
distinction is that debunking is constitutively an act 
of criticism, whereas truth-telling need not be. Indeed, 
Tom Boland (2013: 231), drawing on an etymological 
study by Reinhart Koselleck, suggests that a significant 
shift in the structure of criticism from the “revelation 
of truth within crisis” to a practice of skepticism and 
exposé was roughly coterminous with the advent of 
the nineteenth century in Europe. At the same time, 
debunking false prophets and practices of worship is 
an ancient business indeed. As Eric Voegelin (2001: 
494) observed of Jeremiah’s critique of idolatry, the 
argument employed “is almost that of an Enlighten-
ment philosopher who wants to dissolve superstition 
through information.”4
Let us proceed now to a brief preliminary typology 
of logics and practices of exposé in the fakescape.
3. The classic definition is Aristotle’s in his Poetics, where 
he describes anagnorisis, or recognition, as a “change 
from ignorance to knowledge, leading to friendship or 
enmity” (1452a30–32).
4. And one can go beyond Christianity to earlier 
euhemeristic theory and Socrates’s rhetorical debunking 
of myth as described in Phaedrus. 
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1. Fakes as truth-telling devices
Hoaxes and acts of disguise and imitation are by 
no means always valued negatively and may be em-
ployed in the service of “truth,” as with the (not 
uncontroversial) use of placebo medicines in clinical 
trials, and dramatic impersonations that are essential 
for reaching climactic points of revelation of truth and 
transformation. Following from this, we can see that 
the work of exposing fakes frequently relies on fakes 
that expose, pitting, so to speak, deception against de-
ception. If Jeremiah’s critique was an instance of what 
Latour would call subtractive antifetishism, fetishes 
(fakes) may just as well join the antifetishistic cause. 
A recent example is the Church of the Flying Spa-
ghetti Monster, a mode of pseudo-deception since it 
is so obviously a parody religion.5 Yet its purpose is se-
rious. Not unlike the “didactic hoaxes” (Fleming and 
O’Carroll 2010) we briefly discussed earlier, which lie 
in order to tell the truth, the hyperbolic artifice of the 
5. The church, also known as the Pastafarian movement, 
was founded by physics graduate Bobby Henderson in 
2005. He had taken issue with the Kansas State Board 
of Education’s decision to teach Intelligent Design as 
an alternative theory to evolution. He wrote an open 
letter supporting the decision to teach more than one 
perspective but insisting “that students also be taught 
a third perspective: the possibility that the Earth was 
created by a Flying Spaghetti Monster. As Henderson 
put it, ‘I think we can all look forward to the time when 
these three theories are given equal time in our science 
classrooms across the country, and eventually the world; 
One third time for Intelligent Design, one third time 
for Flying Spaghetti Monsterism, and one third time for 
logical conjecture based on overwhelming observable 
evidence’” (Laycock 2013: 24). See Laycock (2013) for 
an excellent account. 
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Spaghetti Monster creed suggests the artifice of the 
religions it sends up: invention to reveal invention.6 
The parody religion is a fake, but not one that passes 
itself off as real, for knowledge of its fakeness is nec-
essary in order to set up the necessary comparison be-
tween it and the established religions being parodied. 
Indeed, encouraging comparison by the observer is in-
tegral to critique’s operation. Taking on, but also criti-
cally modifying, features of the object of critique is key. 
Similarly, for the Indian atheist activist who dons holy 
man-style saffron robes and flowing locks and per-
forms “miracles,” fakery is a conscious strategy—not 
at all the sincerest form of flattery, this is imitation to 
disarm and take down. Having amazed his audience, 
who took him for a holy man, the activist dramatically 
disrobes before demonstrating how these “miracles”—
now revealed to be no more than tawdry tricks—can 
be performed by anyone.7 Like Yukaghir hunters in 
northeastern Siberia who transform their bodies into 
the image of their prey all the better to catch and kill 
them (Willerslev 2004), atheist activists dress up as 
6. The church relies on a “conception of religion [that] 
emerged during the early modern period in response 
to both the wars between Catholics and Protestants 
and colonial encounters with the cultures of Asia, 
Africa, and the Americas. Elements of other cultures 
were examined to determine whether they might 
constitute ‘religion,’ but the category itself was taken 
for granted. … By inventing religion ‘as a second-order, 
generic concept’, the Western world also provided 
the possibility to manipulate the criteria ascribed to 
this category in order to create absurdities” (Laycock 
2013: 20).
7. See Copeman (2012) and Copeman and Quack (2015) 
on issues concerning gurus and imitation. 
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holy men all the better to unmask them; similarity is 
strategy. While we are squarely in the terrain, here, of 
enlightenment debunking and antifetishism, in both 
the cases discussed debunkers borrow from the phe-
nomena they seek to debunk—a key strategic trait of 
the fake that exposes other fakes. Mobilizing “matters 
of fact” is not the only means of debunking.
There are other means, too, by which fakes may 
“tell the truth.” In briefly recounting several instances 
of what might be termed a more extrinsic, unpremed-
itated variety of exposé, we shift to a domain where—
unlike the carefully designed hoax—subjective inten-
tions need not lie behind the revealing of truths. We 
find, instead, a kind of second order unconcealing. In 
a discussion of mate selection among rabbits, which 
draws heavily on the work of W. D. Hamilton, Richard 
Dawkins (2006: 305–6) asks whether, in order to assist 
males in being selected by females acting as “doctors,” 
“will genes for faking good health be favoured?” At first 
this may be the case, but selection would act in turn on 
female rabbits to improve their ability to unveil the 
parasite-ridden, yet skillfully bluffing, male rabbit. In 
the end, suggests Dawkins, “females will become such 
good doctors that males will be forced, if they advertise 
at all, to advertise honestly.” Faking good health, albeit 
in a convoluted manner and over some time, would 
lead eventually to (the telling of ) “the truth.”
Consider also the example of a “fake” blood do-
nation event in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, 
in which political party activists sought the politically 
advantageous publicity of blood donation by posing 
for photographs “as if ” they were donating their blood, 
but without actually doing so. While the Indian press 
carried a straightforward exposé of this unscrupulous 
behavior, a second order exposé is conducted, so to 
speak, by the fake itself. Significantly, the (non)event 
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formed part of a larger political field that had placed 
blood donation, and blood petitions, blood letters, and 
blood paintings at the center of mass political com-
munication. Prior to this (non)event, it was already 
well known that blood donation camps organized by 
political parties were liable to be cancelled if a leader 
was unable to attend, and that if they did attend, they 
often broke up immediately on their departure. The 
example from Andhra Pradesh is of the same genus 
as such (abortive) camps, but its cynicism—its actually 
posed nature—seemed to dramatically reveal and un-
derscore, by logical extension, the posed nature of the 
rest of the country’s hematological politics. What was 
in any case gestural politics, here it was to be found, 
finally, in its “purest” fake form. The realization seemed 
to dawn: well of course the political activists’ blood do-
nations were fake—political parties only take people’s 
blood.8 Sasha Newell’s (2013) work on brand bluffeurs 
in Côte d’Ivoire is another case in point. Discussing 
the conspicuous display of fake branded goods—an-
other case of pseudo-deception since onlookers are 
well aware they are fake yet willing to suspend their 
disbelief—Newell argues that “local understandings 
of performative magic merge with anxieties about au-
thenticity and modes of imitative reproduction at the 
heart of capitalist economies,” shedding light on them 
(2013: 140). What the Ivoirian bluff does ultimately is 
to expose how “capitalist value in the global economy 
is itself a product of bluffing” (Newell 2013). No one is 
8. The refrain “Neta janata ka khuun chooste hain”—
“Politicians suck the people’s blood” is a familiar one, 
certainly in the north of the country. A more detailed 
discussion of this episode may be found in Copeman 
and Banerjee (2019). 
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interested here in exposing fakes; it is fakes themselves 
that do that work. 
2. Exposé as a species of rhetoric, debunking as a 
practice of freedom
The purpose of acts of debunking is to persuade their 
audiences of the falseness or hollowness of particu-
lar ideas, beliefs, or practices, and/or to inculcate in 
the viewer a self-reflexive critical disposition ( Jones 
2010). Debunking and exposé are therefore a species 
of rhetoric, a style of argument. Michael Carrithers 
(2005: 577), whose aim has been to rehabilitate rhet-
oric as both anthropological subject and method, 
seeks to explain humans’ character “not so much as 
culture-bearing beings, but rather as something more, 
as culture-creating and -changing beings.” Debunk-
ing reflects this emphasis well: many, if not all, of its 
forms seek to change culture (“improve” its quantum 
of truth). Debunking is more than just speech; as we 
have seen, it can involve creative juxtaposition, imi-
tation to disarm, different techniques of vision. Peter 
Lamont’s (2010) work on nineteenth-century psycho-
logical demonstration of error (e.g., belief in spirit-
ualism) shows just how debunking can perform the 
work of rhetoric. As he puts it, “debunking has been 
used as an opportunity to persuade others of the im-
portance of psychological knowledge, and the discur-
sive deployment of a psychology of erroneous belief 
has been key” (2010: 38). The purpose of producing 
“rigid observations” to debunk assumptions informing, 
say, mesmerism, was precisely to persuade a “gullible 
public” not only of the illusionary nature of particular 
beliefs but also of the worth of psychological exper-
tise (2010: 42). Similarly in the case of Indian atheist 
activists and their exposure of “fake miracles,” the aim 
of their debunking is to persuade their fellow citizens 
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of the validity of science and “encourage a critical out-
look amongst the people.”9 To open up the black box 
of debunking, then, is to find an array of tools, tricks, 
and skilled deployments of schema whose focus is on 
creating and changing culture: the stuff of rhetoric.10
And if, as anthropologists, we wish to pay atten-
tion to what people think they are doing when they are 
debunking fakes, we must also pay attention to ques-
tions of freedom. These same atheist activists see “the 
debunking of ‘magical trickery’ as a liberating exercise 
that enables the freeing of the ‘backward’ masses from 
the shackles of ‘superstition’” (Srinivas 2015: 397). For 
Latour, this would be taken as pure conceit, but the 
connection between these liberating gestures and eco-
nomic freedom is constantly made by activists: to be 
free from fake gurus and their fake miracles is also to 
be free from economic exploitation. Such actions take 
place squarely within the province of the enlighten-
ment deployment of facts of matter to expose illusions, 
but are they reducible to “critical barbarism” if the de-
struction of knowledge is also a clearing of ground for 
new knowledge and/or the “exercise of freedom”? 
The will to know, as we saw at the outset with refer-
ence to the work of Denis Dutton, is frequently at the 
heart of projects of unveiling fakes: if artwork forgeries 
remain unexposed, our knowledge of art history re-
mains compromised. At a very prosaic level, university 
9. Cited in Quack (2011).
10. See also Jesse Shipley’s work on spiritual fakery in 
Ghana (2009), which foregrounds the rich diversity of 
means of unveiling: “Assessing fakery in performance 
is at the centre of a sphere of moral deliberation that 
is not defined by a particular medium. It moves across 
radio, television, theatre, comedy, preaching, and music, 
as both lament and entertainment” (2009: 524). 
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use of a technology of exposé (viz. plagiarism detec-
tion software) for checking student essays is a means 
for helping to safeguard both teachers’ proper knowl-
edge of student aptitudes and what is taken to be the 
proper production of knowledge itself. After Sigmund 
Freud,11 we might term practices of knowledge expo-
sure a specific form of epistemophilia.12 They express 
11. Freudian techniques are available for considering both 
sides of the coin: the impulse informing the desire to 
expose, and the secret, unconscious desire to be exposed. 
For Freud, “the infant’s desire to look is ‘an instinctual 
erotic activity’ focused on the genitals and particularly 
on the mother’s penis. … The search for this imaginary 
object ‘leaves indelible traces on the mental life of the 
child, who has pursued that portion of his infantile 
sexual researches with particular thoroughness’” (Freud 
cited in Brooks 2001: 121). Proceeding from this point, 
debunking practices might be considered the eroticized 
pursuit of an imaginary object, a line of thinking that is 
taken up by Slavoj Žižek (2000) in his examination of 
artworks depicting partially exposed bodies: “The crucial 
point (or, rather, the underlying illusion) of traditional 
painting is that the ‘true’ incestuous naked body is none 
the less waiting there to be discovered—in short, the 
illusion of traditional realism does not lie in the faithful 
rendering of the depicted objects; rather, it lies in the 
belief that behind the directly rendered objects is the 
absolute Thing which could be possessed if only we were 
able to discard the obstacles or prohibitions that prevent 
access to it” (2000: 7). 
12. Brooks (2001: 120) explains: “I believe that we owe that 
lovely word to James Strachey, who in the Standard 
Edition of Freud’s work translates Freud’s term Wisstrieb 
as ‘epistemophilic instinct.’ Like many of Strachey’s 
translations, this takes a compound of two simple 
Germanic words and passes it through Greek to arrive 
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a kind of desire whose immediate cause might be to 
expose a particular object of knowledge, but which is 
liable to be waylaid by the very means and processes 
of unveiling: desire coming to lie instead “in the way, 
rather than simply in the endpoint” (Brooks 1993: 9). 
Following from this, modern theorists of narrative 
have “undermined the importance of the content of ex-
posure in favour of the visual or verbal foreplay which 
precedes its exposure” (Banks and Harris 2004: 12). 
This sexualized understanding of exposure—which 
might draw also on Roland Barthes’s (1973) discus-
sion of the unveiling of the striptease artist’s body as 
akin to the exposure of narrative mysteries—apparent-
ly turns Latour’s analysis on its head. The point is not 
that fetishes are unveiled but that unveiling itself is a 
fetish. 
The other side of the coin—the unconscious desire 
to be exposed—is not our main focus here, but briefly, 
the idea follows from Freud’s (1930) understanding 
of guilt, and how it is not so much that underhand 
(duplicitous, false, counterfeit, criminal) behavior pro-
duces guilt but that guilt produces such behavior. It 
is only a minor extension of this argument to suggest 
that the faker fakes out of his or her unconscious de-
sire for exposure; the felt sense of deserving to be de-
bunked stimulating the conduct of practices ripe for 
debunking.
at English. ‘Drive for knowledge’ would have been a 
simpler solution. But ‘epistemophilia’ strikes me as a 
felicitous complication, since it preserves the erotic 
sense in which Freud conceives Wisstrieb, and because 
it points us not just to knowledge, but to the roots of 
knowing.”
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3. Exposé as connoisseurship, nationalism, 
entertainment
The overlapping themes of exposé as entertainment, 
connoisseurship, and nationalism are particularly sali-
ent in reference to counterfeit goods.
“Fake watch busta” is an Instagram and Tumblr 
phenomenon in which exposé functions as both en-
tertainment and a sign of the debunker’s connoisseur-
ship, with the ability to discern the counterfeit watch 
a marker of distinction in Pierre Bourdieu’s (1984) 
sense.13 If the internet can seem like a colossal aceph-
alous fakescape, it is also, and equally, a technology 
of exposé of the fakes it features and gives rise to.14 
The linked “Fake watch busta” websites typically fea-
ture hip hop artists’ publicity shots, accompanied by 
judgments—stamped in bold capitals upon the shots 
themselves—concerning the authenticity of the brand-
ed watches worn in them (“FAKE!” “GENUINE!”). 
“Below the line” user comments signal mirth, intrigue, 
consternation, and disputation, depending on subject 
position. The tone of the sites mixes irony and insight: 
the judgments reveal not only fake watches but reflect 
back to us our own obsession with authenticity. For 
all that, the websites still enact a haughty “take down” 
of imitative aspirations; of these artists’ attempts to 
“fake it till they make it.” (The Invention of Tradition, it 
should be evident, is the “Fake watch busta” of scholar-
ship.) This kind of exposé emphatically is the most lit-
eral instance of a practice of distinction, as defined by 
13. See https://www.instagram.com/fakewatchbusta/?hl=en; 
https://gearpatrol.com/2016/03/15/how-to-spot-
counterfeit-watch-fakewatchbusta/ 
14. See Mazzarella (2006: 473) on depictions of the internet 
as “a corruption-exposing X-ray machine.”
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Bourdieu, that may be found. Consumption, he points 
out, is “a stage in a process of communication, that is, 
an act of deciphering, decoding, which presupposes 
practical or explicit mastery of a cipher or code.” The 
exposer of counterfeit goods demonstrates just such a 
mastery of code. Bourdieu also lays emphasis on “the 
capacity to see (voir)” as a function of the knowledge 
of those with the capacity to discern (1984: xxv). In-
stagram and equivalent websites literally and vividly 
underscore the frequently central role of techniques of 
vision in practices of exposé. 
In certain national contexts, to be able to discern 
the genuine article is to be an adequate national citi-
zen; the work of exposé the work of nation building: 
a nationalist brand of distinction. This is one of the 
key points of Newell’s (2013) work, already mentioned, 
on bluffeurs in Côte d’Ivoire: to be able to distinguish 
“real” from “fake” goods is to be a proper modern cit-
izen, as distinct from “outsiders” (immigrants) from 
neighboring countries, whose inability to discern “real” 
from “counterfeit” goods is all too revealing of their 
“fake” citizenship, too. Questions of citizenship and 
the nation are also raised in Susanne Brandtstädter’s 
(2009) work on China, a country whose synonymity 
with the production of counterfeit goods has direct-
ly stimulated the birth of consumer movements there 
demanding quality products. A straightforward equa-
tion is set up between the nation’s development and 
the quality and genuineness of the goods it manufac-
tures, with detecting and exposing fakes coming to be 
framed as patriotic acts with the power to eliminate 
the “national shame” of knockoff goods; signs of ad-
vanced citizenship (qianjing) (2009: 142).
Also instructive here is the case of the discovery 
and exposé of a “fake” Apple Store in China in 2011, as 
discussed in the work of Fan Yang (2014). The episode, 
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which underscored the synonymy between China and 
fakery in the public imagination, pertinently helps to 
disclose the meaning of the work of exposé of coun-
terfeit goods in twenty-first-century global capitalism, 
steering us to the question: Just who is this work for? It 
was an American expat travelling in small-town China 
who came across the store, which looked exactly like 
a conventional Apple Store, with the same distinctive 
gleaming layout, genuine Apple products available for 
purchase, and staff who thought that they were indeed 
employees of a genuine Apple Store. Curious about 
the presence of such a prestigious store in nondescript 
provincial China (Kunming), the American did some 
internet research. The store, indeed, was not genuine. 
Duly exposed as such in her blog, the story was picked 
up by international news outlets such as the BBC 
and circulated globally. The store was closed. As Yang 
(2014: 86) notes, the role of a “regular” expat citizen 
(and the many Apple online forum users who mocked 
it and news outlets who circulated news of it) in de-
bunking the store and enforcing the global intellectual 
property rights (IPR) regime is striking: “While these 
Apple users and observers have no official affiliation 
with the company, they have willingly turned them-
selves into an army of ‘fake detectives’ ... [acting] as 
volunteers on behalf of the globalizing IPR regime to 
regulate and govern difference by way of ‘authenticat-
ing sameness.’” Moreover, the teasing and contemptu-
ous language of the online forum users demonstrates 
their enjoyment of such detective work. Similarly, us-
er-uploaded video compilations on YouTube—appar-
ently made by tourists—depict obviously fake store-
fronts in China. “Below the line” comments gleefully 
mock the unsophisticated rip-offs and reinforce stere-
otypes of China’s pathological, and at the same time 
amusingly crude, production of fakes; exposé as a kind 
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of meme or enjoyable pastime. Yet, once more, such 
work could have been done on behalf of Starbucks and 
McDonald’s. To return to “Fake watch busta”: though 
shot through with irony and knowingness, its contrib-
utors are nonetheless fake detectives exposing either 
the failure of another’s “fronting” or, where the wearer 
being exposed mistakenly thinks the watch is genuine, 
the inability of others to make the distinctions that 
matter. While there may, on the one hand, presently be 
“a creeping assumption … that there are things more 
important than truth” (Campbell 2002: 12), it can also 
seem—at least in the arena of counterfeit goods (and 
stores)—that such is our continued deep investment 
in the real, we are willing to do the policing of the 
(true) brand ourselves, and enjoy it, too. The internet—
as much as it gives rise to fakes—also constitutes a 
kind of crowdsourced classification technology to sort 
the things out that it otherwise mixes together15—from 
pollution to purity, matter no longer out of place, and 
critique firmly in the service of capitalism (cf. Boltanski 
and Chiapello 2005).
4. Exposé’s risk of failure
Discussing magic, Stanley Tambiah borrows the 
phrase “falsification riddle” from Karl Popper: “If in-
deed magical acts are decisively falsified,” asks Tambi-
ah, “why do they continue to be enacted?” (1990: 46). 
If we take exposé to be a form of falsification—falsi-
fication by way of revelation—then the question con-
cerning our own “exposé riddle” becomes: If fakes are 
frequently decisively falsified, why do they continue to 
be enacted, indeed, to proliferate? While the answer, 
15. The reference here is to Bowker and Starr’s Sorting 
Things Out (1999). 
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rather obviously, is because exposé frequently is not 
effective in the manner intended, the ways in which it 
can fail are interestingly diverse. 
The subjects of exposé may seek to expose exposers 
in cycles of negative reciprocity, with the dubiousness 
of methods employed for exposé having the potential 
to undermine exposé’s effects. In the United Kingdom, 
the “fake sheikh”—a sham Arab businessman em-
ployed by The News of the World (now defunct) to se-
cretly record films exposing various misdemeanors on 
the part of the great and the good—is currently serv-
ing time for perverting the course of justice.16 Decep-
tion to expose deception may result in empty exposé.
It is a straightforward but still important point that 
“enlightening critiques are often unsuccessful, indicat-
ing the limits of ‘unmasking’ illusions and revealing 
reality, perhaps as a deployment of discourse which 
fails to grasp the meaning of rituals or behaviour de-
nounced” (Boland and Clogher 2017: 127).17 Logics 
of exposé can seem to misunderstand the nature of 
commitment. On the one hand, “preferring palat-
able illusions to hard truths relates to false prophets 
who predict a bright and easy future for the chosen 
people, requiring no ethical transformation—‘saying, 
“Peace, peace” when there is no peace’ ( Jeremiah 5:14)” 
(Boland and Clogher 2017: 127). On the other, it may 
simply be the case that it was never in the first place 
the honesty/reality/non fakery of the target of de-
bunking that was important to supporters; debunking 
16. Undercover reporter Mazher Mahmood, who often 
posed as a sheikh, has been accused of multiple cases of 
entrapment. In 2016 he was sentenced to 15 months in 
prison. 
17. A charge frequently leveled at Richard Dawkins’s The 
God Delusion, for example. 
EXPOSING FAKES 83
fakes in such instances will likely have little effect oth-
er than, in some cases, reasserting the commitment of 
supporters to the target, now taken as the victim of a 
“witch-hunt.” Mazzarella (2006: 473) has asked: “Is it 
possible to cause a sensation by revealing something 
that everybody already knows?” Fact-checkers may 
tirelessly debunk a political candidate’s false claims, 
but if their support is not contingent on their telling 
of the truth, and everyone in any case knows many of 
their claims are lies, then debunking, again, will carry 
little heft.
While these points recall well-publicized efforts to 
debunk “fake news,” we can also think here of the de-
bunking of “false” gurus in India. Given the historical 
significance in Indian devotionalism of enduring tests 
of faith, hidden camera unveilings of an officially cel-
ibate guru having sexual intercourse—for instance—
may be taken by devotees as occasions to both prove 
and intensify their devotional commitment—preor-
dained tests of their true loyalties.18 Relatedly, there is 
also the recognition that “really real” gurus may be fak-
ing their fakeness (Khandelwal 2004: 173)—another 
reason not to be too dismissive of even those who ap-
pear most obviously fake, and potentially to distrust 
actions of exposé rather than to hail them for creating 
conditions of trust.
Exposé suffers from a further self-defeating pro-
pensity, which lies in what we can call the problem of 
the synecdoche. The debunker—especially one acting 
in the domain of supposedly false beliefs and mag-
ical practices—tends to act according to the under-
standing that others, like they do, will take a part to 
be in some way representative of the whole; viz. if one 
18. See Copeman and Ikegame (2012) for fuller discussion. 
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miracle-performing holy man is successfully exposed 
as fraudulent, then those witness to the debunking will 
be less credulous of miracles as a whole. But that, of 
course, is not necessarily the case. Specific hail charms 
and curers can be branded fraudulent, but such scruti-
ny might well “leave the main belief in the prophetic 
and therapeutic powers of witch-doctors unimpaired” 
(Evans-Pritchard [1937] 1976: 107; see Lévi-Strauss 
1963).19 In other words, rather than the part standing 
for the whole, the part is quite easily detached from the 
whole: the audience may not take a synecdochal view at 
all. While the specter of the fraudulent spiritual leader 
may breed anxiety about the origins of (spiritual) val-
ue, “fakery appears as the margin, the horizon against 
which a moral centre is clarified” (Shipley 2009: 524), 
which is to say that the very work of exposé that suc-
cessfully designates someone a fake witch-doctor or 
guru can seem to rest on the assumption (and recon-
firm as fact) that real or true witch-doctors or gurus do 
exist; debunkers’ very success may be their failure.
“Only when there is a possible Lying Worm,” says 
Lewis Hyde, “can we begin to speak of a True Worm” 
(1998: 60). A parallel is found in Martin Heidegger’s 
work on truth, in which he draws on the Greek alethia, 
with its connotations of unveiling and unconcealed-
ness, to construe truth as that which has been uncon-
cealed (Heidegger 1993). Thus, for Heidegger, “truth 
as unveiling necessarily also involves non-truth, since 
concealment is the mode by which unconcealment 
appears.20 In this ‘truth-event’ (Wahrheitsgeschehen) 
19. See Copeman and Hagström (2018) for more on these 
matters. 
20. See also Constantine Nakassis’s (2013) argument that 
authentic branded goods do not simply create the 
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… truth itself—the truth of Being—is ‘unconcealed’” 
(Banks and Harris 2004: 10). No truth without fakes. 
If ever the work of exposé were to be completed, and 
every fake revealed as such, not only the Lying Worm, 
but also the True Worm, would vanish into thin air. 
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chapter 6
Fake, unreal, and absurd 
Alexei Yurchak, University of 
California, Berkeley
The term fake in reference to news and representations 
of facts has come to dominate much of political and 
media discourse in the United States today. Surely, 
it would be too facile to interpret this focus on fake 
as simply an attempt to guard the straightforward 
boundary between fake representations and true rep-
resentations, between fake language that misrepresents 
reality and true language that represents it accurately. 
It is commonplace that every media channel and po-
litical statement represents facts in a particular way 
and interprets them through particular ideological as-
sumptions. However, there is something different and 
new in the current focus on fake, something that goes 
beyond what the familiar critiques of representations 
and presuppositions seem to capture. To make sense 
of this new interest in fake today it is helpful to pay 
attention to the lexicon that is used to critically discuss 
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it. Reminding us that the whole world today is still 
“post-Soviet” and “post-Cold War,” Susan Buck-Morss 
remarked that in these conditions progressive political 
analysis must not only critically analyze the global eco-
nomic and political conditions, it must simultaneously 
subject to scrutiny the terms in which it performs this 
analysis (Buck-Morss 2006). 
Broadly, the language that dominates the US me-
dia and public discourse is that of liberalism. Like with 
any language, the terms in which it conducts political 
analysis clarify some aspects of political reality and ob-
scure others. A familiar example of this effect is the 
opposition of “democracy” and “authoritarianism,” 
which has occupied a dominant status in much of the 
US media and political discourse since the Cold War. 
While the description that this opposition provides is 
not without merit, it also contributes to unfairly de-
coupling “democracy” from “capitalism” and to making 
the latter less visible, therefore to concealing much of 
the real geopolitical context. 
Another example of the distorting effect that the 
language of liberalism performs is the use of the terms 
“Global North” and “Global South” that today occupies 
a prominent position in the media and in academia. 
During the Cold War the world was routinely spoken 
of in terms of a tripartite division—the First World, 
the Second World, and the Third World. In practice, 
the phrases “the First World” (industrialized, capi-
talist countries) and “the Second World” (pro-Soviet 
countries of state socialism) were rarely used, but “the 
Third World” was a popular term that designated the 
developing and postcolonial countries. In fact, when 
the term “the Third World” (le tiers monde) was coined 
in 1952 by French demographer Alfred Sauvy, it was 
designed not to divide the world into three camps 
but to suggest a parallel with “the third estate” (le tiers 
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état)—a term from the French Revolution that referred 
to a social strata that did not belong to the nobility and 
the clergy and therefore could potentially rise against 
the world marked by the highly uneven distribution of 
wealth (Sauvy 1952). Sauvy’s “third world,” by anal-
ogy, referred to the poorer countries and colonies as 
a global third estate. This term was not about hierar-
chy but about social position. But when this term was 
appropriated by the Cold War discourses of develop-
ment—both capitalist and state-socialist—it acquired 
the meaning of a hierarchy between three camps (as 
less and more “developed”) that was further inflected 
through the Cold War opposition and skewed the rep-
resentation of the world accordingly. 
With the collapse of state socialism in 1989–91, 
this triple picture was replaced with the binary of the 
“Global North” and “Global South.” While this sub-
stitution is often described as a progressive attempt to 
de-emphasize the hierarchical relation between the in-
dustrialized “West” and developing world, in practice 
it also contributes to reproducing multiple liberal dis-
tortions. The language of “Global North” and “Global 
South” relegates the history of world socialism to an 
inconsequential aberration in the history of liberal cap-
italism. For example, it leaves no space for many former 
“Second World” countries of state socialism, especially 
those that are not integrated today into the liberal in-
stitutions of global capitalism, such as the EU, NATO, 
etc. Russia does not fit into either the Global North 
or Global South; its past and present are rendered in-
visible by this terminology. This binary language also 
obscures the real differences between the countries that 
are placed in the category of “the South” today, many of 
which used to be affiliated with either the US capitalist 
or Soviet socialist models. However, the real difference 
between them is important for understanding their 
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current encounters with global capitalism. The “de-
veloping countries” that were variously involved with 
the socialist model included not only countries with 
communist governments (e.g., Mongolia, Vietnam, 
Cuba) but also countries that in different periods pur-
sued “noncapitalist paths of development” and received 
Soviet scientific, educational, economic, or military aid 
(Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, India, Chile, Algeria, 
South Yemen, Laos, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many 
others). Relegating them to the space of the Global 
South along with many other countries is to erase the 
economic and political history of global socialism that 
affected their development and made them different. 
Another example of the distortion performed by 
liberal language is its current reframing of the polit-
ical world in the United States in terms of “patriots” 
and “traitors” or “foreign agents.” Donald Trump’s 
unexpected win in the presidential elections is fre-
quently discussed in this language not as a reflection 
or symptom of actual social changes that have taken 
place inside the United States but as a manifestation 
of malicious interference from outside. While it is 
clear that some sort of interference did take place, at 
the moment it is far from obvious what aspects of this 
interference are true and whether and to what extent 
they have been consequential. But such considerations 
seem to be of secondary importance today. The dis-
course on interference seems to be important, at least 
in part, not for how truthfully it represents reality but 
for how successfully it renders the unexpected outcome 
of the elections as illegitimate, not ours, and in need of 
being reverted. One regrettable result of this discursive 
shift is that a critical analysis of the domestic political 
situation in the United States becomes difficult. The 
binary language of patriots and traitors allows one to 
avoid confronting the sad result of the long neoliberal 
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hegemony that disenfranchised millions of people and 
helped to shape the “unexpected” vote of so many in 
the elections (see Hochschild 2016; Vance 2016). This 
language also makes it easier not to take responsibility 
for the bankrupt policies of the neoliberal establish-
ment and harder to discuss alternatives. If Trump’s win 
is reduced to his collusion with a foreign power, real 
politics becomes displaced onto the stereotyped figures 
of foreign agents and true patriots who oppose them. 
Liberal discourse also reduces “Russia” to a space that 
supposedly exists outside of the geopolitical context, a 
zone that is subjected exclusively to its own internal logic 
of authoritarianism and corruption and that is populated 
by an army of computer hackers, internet trolls and KGB/
GRU/FSB agents. In the early 2000s, anthropologist 
Matti Bunzl observed that after the first post-communist 
decade, Europe had found itself caught “between an-
ti-Semitism and Islamophobia” (Bunzl 2005). Today, 
Western liberal media rejects “Islamophobia” but in-
creasingly seems to embrace “Russophobia.” An arti-
cle in the Washington Post described the conservative 
and nationalist forces in Europe that are allied with 
Trump as “a motley cast of Euroskeptics, Islamophobes, 
Russophiles, and  neo-Nazis” (Tharoor 2017). Russo-
philes—people interested in Russian history, culture, 
and language—are grouped here with neo-Nazis. The 
article, remarkably, denounces “Islamophobia” and “Rus-
sophilia” in one breath. 
Curiously, this displacement of political analysis 
onto the language of patriots versus traitors and foreign 
agents, mirrors precisely the tactic used by the Putin 
government in Russia. Tellingly, Russian liberal media 
that often opposes the government also contributes 
to this binary picture of the world. Both pro-Putin 
nationalists and anti-Putin liberals claim that Russia 
is divided into two camps that they often call “two 
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Russias,” except their interpretation of these two 
Russias is reversed (Matveev 2014). In the language 
of state media, the two Russias are represented by “pa-
triots” and “foreign agents”; patriots, it is claimed, are 
the majority of Russians who care about their country 
and support the state and the government, while trai-
tors are a small group of overprivileged pro-Western 
urban liberals whose opposition to the government is 
funded through foreign (i.e., “Western”) grants and 
salaries. Putin’s government requires that all recip-
ients of foreign grants in Russia (including cultural, 
educational, social, and medical organizations) should 
be registered as “foreign agents” and banned from the 
political process.
To reproduce this binary model, Russian federal 
TV channels, with an audience of a hundred million, in 
their news programs and political talk shows mix real 
facts with fake facts. The main effect of this practice is 
not necessarily that the audiences are fooled into be-
lieving every imaginary story and fact, but rather that 
they learn that “facts” may be read not for how true 
or false they are, but for how effective or ineffective, 
patriotic or unpatriotic, pro-Russian or pro-Western 
they are. This model teaches the audience to read polit-
ical discourse at the level of its performative dimension 
(how successfully it represents) rather than its consta-
tive dimension (how truthfully it represents) (Aliukov 
2017). In this approach, even if one considers some 
facts to be true, one may still believe that it is more im-
portant (e.g., for considerations of security, sovereign-
ty, patriotism, loyalty, etc.) to conceal or misrepresent 
them. This public approach to “truth” is also routinely 
encountered in the United States today, for example, 
in a widespread opinion that Wikileaks should not be 
allowed to publish facts, which is a shift from a cul-
ture that celebrated whistleblowers (see “WikiLeaks’ 
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piracy” 2017). This situation is also comparable to the 
political discourse of the party and state media during 
the late Soviet period, when the dominant political 
rhetoric experienced a “performative shift” (Yurchak 
2006), whereby the form of political language became 
fixed and highly predictable, and repeating this form 
from one context to the next was usually more impor-
tant than attending to the referential meanings asso-
ciated with it. 
Recently, the techniques and practices of the per-
formative shift have been revived, and with the intro-
duction of online social media they have dramatically 
expanded. One example is online trolling conducted 
by companies that seem to have some links to the 
Russian government, although these links are indirect 
and not always easy to prove. The job of online trolls 
is to insert fake personal opinions, fake eyewitness ac-
counts, and fake rumors into real online discussions. 
One such company is located in Saint Petersburg and 
hides its true occupation under the name “Internet Re-
search Limited.” Russian users of social media who are 
well aware of this situation ironically call employees 
of this company “trolls” and the company itself, “Troll 
Factory” (Yurchak 2016).
Employees of the Troll Factory receive daily as-
signments of what social media sites and blogs to visit, 
what topics to comment on, what opinions to voice 
and what key words to use. Acting like regular on-
line users, they hide their true identity behind mul-
tiple fake accounts, registered under fake names, with 
traffic diverted through remote proxy servers (Chen 
2015; Rezunkov 2015; Walker 2015; Yurchak 2016). 
Importantly, companies such as Troll Factory are not 
actually partisan news agencies, like Russia 24 or Fox 
News. The main purpose of these trolls’ activities is 
not to legitimate one party line but rather to erase 
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the boundary between facts and fakes, redirecting the 
online discussions of different representations of the 
world from how true or untrue they are to how ef-
fective or ineffective they are and what interests they 
allegedly serve. Again, in this case the performative di-
mension of political discourse (how successfully it rep-
resents) is emphasized at the expense of its constative 
dimension (how truthfully it represents). 
For example, among many comments that the em-
ployees of the Troll Factory posted on the Russian and 
Ukrainian social media sites concerning the confron-
tation in Eastern Ukraine, some were in support of the 
separatists and against the Ukrainian military opera-
tion in the East, others voiced the opposite position, 
and the third sounded confused, lamenting that it was 
impossible to find out the real situation. The effect of 
this multiplicity of postings was to defocus the online 
discussions and to make it harder to figure out real 
facts. The trolls also posted similar comments and dis-
cussions in the US social media before the presidential 
elections. Some comments, for example, made claims 
against Hillary Clinton, others contained antiestab-
lishment rhetoric, and the third advocated progressive 
causes (e.g., sharing the social grievances of the US 
war veterans or championing the “Black Lives Matter” 
movement) (Rusiaeva and Yurchak 2016; Zakharov 
2017). Again, the goal of these multiple postings was 
not to advocate one political position, but to make all 
political positions appear confusing, suspicious, serv-
ing various interests rather than representing facts. 
The performative dimension of political discourse 
was again emphasized at the expense of its constative 
dimension. 
In the Russian context, the state and its media are 
not alone in the work of misrepresenting Russia as the 
country divided into us and them, into “two Russias.” 
FAKE, UNREAL, AND ABSURD 99
The language that is used by the liberal opposition also 
draws this portrait of “two Russias,” except this picture 
is reversed. The majority of Russians are described in 
this language as a passive, conformist, and apolitical 
mass that has been brainwashed by progovernment 
media. On the contrary, representatives of the liberal 
opposition describe themselves as an active Western-
ized minority that values liberal democracy and em-
braces capitalism. This ideology is perpetuated by many 
groups of the urban liberal intelligentsia—journalists, 
cultural producers, entrepreneurs, and white-collar 
workers. Stressing the supposed cultural differences 
between these two Russias, liberal discourse presents 
them as insurmountable. In the words of liberal jour-
nalist Valerii Pniushkin, there is a paradigmatic differ-
ence between the lovers of pel ’meni (dumplings, tradi-
tional Russian peasant food) and the lovers of oysters 
(refined Western import) (Matveev 2014; Yurchak 
2017). Pel’meni represent the Russian masses’ inability 
to change and their supposed love for paternalistic au-
thoritarianism. Oysters are the sign of a cosmopolitan 
outlook, market democracy, and liberal values. Many 
derogatory terms are used in this media to refer to 
the “brainwashed” majority (“86 percent” and “cotton 
wads” [vata] are among the most innocent). 
This liberal discourse completely ignores the geo-
political context of global capitalism and US hegem-
ony, treating the authoritarian politics of the Russian 
state as an isolated, ahistorical, local phenomenon that 
is reduced either to the Russian people’s alleged love 
for despotic authoritarian figures or to their “imperi-
al nostalgia” or to a nationwide indoctrination. It also 
ignores the actual political struggles in Russia; you 
will rarely read in the liberal media about labor strikes 
and opposition marches around the country, and 
when these protests are mentioned, they are explained 
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as symptoms of a naïve proto-communist aversion 
to individual freedoms and the private market or as 
movements that are reinterpreted in pro-Western lib-
eral terms. In 2011 and 2012, the country was overrun 
by mass protests against rigged elections. Hundreds 
of thousands of people took to the streets. Most par-
ticipants in these protests were regular people from 
provincial cities and towns. In 2015 and once again 
in 2017, truckers all over Russia blocked long-dis-
tance highways in protest against the newly intro-
duced draconian tax laws that stifled small businesses. 
Workers in the provincial town of Kaluga protested 
against the administration of “Benteler Automotive” 
factory that refused to recognize their membership 
in the Trans-Regional Trade Union of Autoworkers 
(Matveev 2014). In June 2017, high school kids in the 
provincial town of Bryansk protested against corrup-
tion in the government and the local school admin-
istration. These protests are directed as much against 
authoritarian state power as against corporate capital-
ism and neoliberal privatization. However, by substi-
tuting a critical analysis of this political situation with 
the imaginary figure of “two Russias,” local liberalism 
becomes complicit with the pro-Putin nationalism 
that it is presumed to oppose. The discourse on two 
Russias belongs to the family of fake representations. 
To be sure, much of Western liberal media’s coverage 
of Russia, with its reduction of the world to the binary 
of democracy versus authoritarianism, enthusiastically 
contributes to this effect (Yurchak 2017).
A progressive critique of the real political condi-
tions in the country must oppose the fake discourse of 
“two Russias” and contest both the liberal and nation-
alist ideologies. It must also oppose the analyses of the 
Russian political context that reduces it to a localized 
authoritarian history and instead insist on considering 
FAKE, UNREAL, AND ABSURD 101
Russian political developments in relation to the ge-
opolitical context. To subject to scrutiny the terms in 
which much of the analysis is performed, a progressive 
critique must develop a different critical language—
one that transcends binary models and their depoliti-
cizing vocabulary and speaks from a position external 
to them. 
A new political movement that emerged in Russia 
in the past few years under the name of “monstration” 
has started experimenting with this kind of political 
language. Monstrations are parades in which thousands 
of young people walk through city centers carrying 
slogans that at first appear absurd and incomprehen-
sible. State-controlled media calls these rallies sense-
less carnivals and meaningless fun. At the same time, 
state officials suspect them of having a hidden political 
message and assemble great numbers of riot police to 
monitor them. This contradictory treatment of mon-
strations—dismissing them as meaningless and yet 
treating them as politically subversive—reflects the 
unique nature of their political discourse. This dis-
course is spoken from outside of the dominant binary 
model and it plays with “fake” discourse to articulate 
its opposition to this model. The semiotics of Charles 
Peirce and his discussion of the sign is helpful to elu-
cidate this approach. 
Monstrations formulate their critical message at 
the level of what Peirce called indexical and iconic ref-
erence, leaving symbolic reference for the absurd. These 
parades happen on May 1, the date that is universal-
ly recognized in Russia for its long political history. 
They look political when considered as a whole, with 
thousands of people walking in a column and carrying 
posters. But each slogan independently makes state-
ments and assertions that appear to be fake—they ei-
ther state facts that are clearly untrue, or make appeals 
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based on false premises, or assert something that is 
so obvious that it requires no assertion. For example, 
“Racoons are people too,” “Roosters are not human,” “I 
am your sugar packet,” “Down with chicken-drivers,” 
“Deer cannot even think,” etc. 
This discourse of fake statements and assertions 
creates an ironic imitation of the dominant model of 
the political and media discourse of the state that mix-
es facts with fakes. Some slogans refer to this mixing 
more directly: “Let’s turn English into Japanese!,” “I 
demand comprehensible slogans,” and “LSD-televi-
sion.” Other posters invoke well-known slogans of the 
political opposition through iconic reference. For ex-
ample, “We commit heterosexuality” and “We support 
same-sex fights.” In Russian the plural form of “fight” 
(draki) rhymes with the plural form of “marriage” 
(braki). Both slogans indirectly oppose the recent law 
“against propaganda of homosexuality.” On the poster 
“Russia without Agutin!,” the name of a famous and 
banal pop-singer Agutin is used to invoke the name 
Putin also through iconic reference, linking it with the 
well-known slogan of the opposition, “Russia without 
Putin!” 
At the front of monstration parades there is al-
ways a banner that states their theme. In Spring 2014, 
Russian special forces cynically and semiclandestine-
ly enforced a referendum on the Crimean peninsula 
when it was declared as part of Russia and no longer 
of Ukraine “by popular demand.” At that time a new 
patriotic slogan, “Crimea is ours!” came to dominate 
Russian progovernment media channels, progovern-
ment rallies, billboards, and T-shirts (Yurchak 2014a). 
The political rhetoric of the liberal opposition in 
Russia, conversely, stressed that Crimea was illegally 
annexed and would not be recognized as Russian by 
the international community. The dominant picture of 
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the political world was divided more than ever into 
Russian patriots and Russophobe traitors, or, alter-
natively, into a conformist pro-Putin majority and 
Westernized enlightened minority. The monstrations 
responded to these events with a different message. On 
May 1, 2014, the country’s main monstration, in the 
city of Novosibirsk, walked behind the banner, “Hell is 
ours”—an ironically negative reference to the “Crimea 
is ours” slogan. Banners in other cities read: “Forward 
to the dark past!,” “Let imbecility rule!,” and “Hurrah! 
The standard of madness has overcome the standard 
of living.”
By referring to the accounts of the Crimean annex-
ation as “Hell is ours” and “Forward to the dark past,” 
monstrations registered their opposition to both the 
annexation performed by Putin’s authoritarian state, 
and the refusal of the liberal discourse, both Russian 
and international, to acknowledge a larger global con-
text within which this controversial act was carried 
out, including the rise of the far right and national-
istic movements in Ukraine that attempted to hijack 
Maidan’s democratic revolution (Yurchak 2014b; 
Ishchenko 2016) and the pushy expansion of NATO 
armies into the former communist spaces under the 
banner of “democratization.” These events have been 
real and have contributed greatly to legitimate Putin’s 
illiberal, authoritarian politics inside Russia. Both 
pro-Putin nationalistic rhetoric and anti-Putin liberal 
discourse are complicit in misrepresenting these polit-
ical and geopolitical contexts. It is a critical distance 
from either side of this political dichotomy that makes 
the discourse of monstrations so unique and able to 
unite diverse groups of people. The rise of the seem-
ingly “absurd” political language of monstrations is 
symptomatic of a crisis of representation that reduces 
the political complexity in and around Russia to the 
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binary division between patriots and traitors, or liber-
als and brainwashed masses, or authoritarianism and 
democracy, effectively depoliticizing political reality 
and obscuring political analysis. 
Today we are witnessing a similar crisis of the lib-
eral model of the media and public discourse in the 
United States. This discourse also tends to reduce 
American society to a simplified model of conserva-
tives versus liberals; or of the supposedly white, sexist, 
fascist bigots of the red states versus the enlightened, 
ethical, cosmopolitan liberals of coastal cities. Recent-
ly it has divided the country further—into the newly 
elected traitors that are manipulated from across the 
ocean by the sinister FSB (formerly KGB), and pa-
triots, whose liberal values would be in jeopardy if not 
protected by the defiant FBI. This picture does much 
to obscure the complex political reality, making it dif-
ficult to analyze the political reasons—local and glob-
al—that led to the current situation. 
The popular appeal of Donald Trump—and be-
fore him Sarah Palin, Herman Cain, and others with 
a penchant for contradictory, uninformed, parodic 
speech—does not necessarily mean that their ideas 
enjoy popular support. But it is a symptom of a grow-
ing popular discontent with this binary picture. These 
figures—Trump in particular, because he could not be 
easily coopted into the Republican Party discourse—
have been perceived by many as speaking from outside 
of this dominant model. Trump’s political rhetoric—
with its lack of knowledge, racist assumptions, and un-
ethical propositions—made his voice appear external 
to this model, which contributed to his popular appeal. 
In the United States, a famous attempt to provide 
an external critique of the dominant model of politi-
cal and media discourse was performed by Jon Stewart 
on the Daily Show. Stewart’s critical voice, at least on 
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many occasions, was directed at both Republicans and 
Democrats, Fox News and CNN (Boyer and Yurchak 
2010). Bill Maher famously attacked Stewart for be-
ing equally harsh on both conservatives and liberals 
as if they were “equally guilty” of bigotry and racism 
(Maher 2010). Stewart responded by saying that he 
did not find it relevant to claim which side in this bi-
nary political divide was “more guilty” because it is the 
model itself that is flawed—the model, in which par-
tisan emphasis on the either-or division substitutes for 
an open analysis of a true multiplicity of positions and 
power relations, which is a fundamental precondition 
for democracy. It was the unique external position of 
Stewart’s voice—his refusal to take sides in the bina-
ry model and to reduce his public commentary to one 
side of the divide—that accounted for his unprece-
dented popularity. 
Trump, of course, is no Stewart. Their speech, 
clarity, and ethical values cannot be further apart. My 
point is different. Trump’s popular appeal among some 
layers of American society might have come from his 
perceived location “outside” of the binary divide, ex-
ternal to the dominant model of the political. When 
the only way to formulate political opposition to par-
tisan misrepresentations is to speak in a language that 
is external to the dominant binary model, parodic, 
politically incorrect, or uninformed discourse may ap-
pear to many as a viable solution. This is perhaps why 
Trump’s bombastic and bigoted rhetoric sounded like 
a fresh political alternative to so many Americans at 
the last presidential election. And this is one reason 
why references to “fake” have become so ubiquitous. In 
the wake of Trump’s unexpected win, this term has ex-
posed something about the political world that had re-
mained largely undiscussed previously. Used today by 
different parties in different, even opposing ways, this 
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term refers not just to one or the other position but to 
the dominant model of analysis that reduces the com-
plex political terrain of power relations in the world to 
binary pictures of patriots versus traitors, enlightened 
liberals versus brainwashed masses, democracy versus 
authoritarianism. 
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chapter 7
“True self ” fantasies
Neil Thin, University of Edinburgh
INTRODUCTION: THE “TRUE SELF” AS A 
FORM OF RELIGIOUS PERSUASION
Fakery, that is, forms of presentation that are deemed 
illegitimate or inauthentic, can be about objects (ming 
vases, breasts); events (fake news, inauthentic festivals); 
activities (e.g., Graeber’s concept of “bullshit jobs”); 
or about particular aspects of personal identity (your 
singing voice or your accent, age, gender, “race,” PhDs). 
Here, I explore personal authenticity, considering what 
tends to be entailed or implied when people talk of the 
whole of a self as either “real” or “fake,” and how this 
relates to the idea of happiness in the sense of a whole 
life going well.
You will, no doubt, have come across plenty of ex-
amples of “true self ” ideology—rhetorical claims that 
each individual has a unique character and destiny that 
is partly or wholly concealed during social interaction, 
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and that is sufficiently mysterious and elusive that as 
individuals we have first to “discover” our true self in 
order to “self-actualize,” to “become who we really are.” 
You have probably been urged to “be yourself,” and felt 
a little perplexed by this, given the multiple identity 
options available to you. The relevance of true self ide-
ology to the anthropology of fakery goes in two quite 
different directions:
R5 True self ideology seems primarily to be about 
avoiding fakery: it discourages the use of deception 
in social encounters, particularly focusing on fake 
identities.
R5 Ironically, however, true self ideology is itself dan-
gerously antisocial fake knowledge: true-selfers 
pretend that each individual has a unique and co-
herent soul and a destiny, and may even urge peo-
ple to “actualize” or “fulfill” that destiny, and in so 
doing to be guided not by other people but by their 
own “inner voice” or “self-determination.”
Any serious social researcher ought therefore to be 
deeply suspicious of the rampant individualism and 
narcissism of true self ideology. It is one thing to 
scratch away at troublesome and unnecessary forms 
of personal inauthenticity, but it is quite another to 
send people off on a hopeless and narcissistic quest to 
find their unique “true self.” The quest for the true self 
is the theme of thousands of self-help texts precisely 
because it is so perplexing. And the reason it is per-
plexing should be obvious enough: there is no single 
“true self ” for us to discover, no predestined life for us 
to “fulfill” through “self-actualization.” True self claims, 
in fact, are deceptive ideologies denying the emergent, 
interactive, and interdependent nature of the human 
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self. In this regard, they have much in common with 
the denial of death.
Along with ancient Buddhist philosophers, the 
Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, and more 
recently psychologists such as Roy Baumeister (1995) 
and Bruce Hood (2012), I take it as axiomatic that 
the human self is an illusion, a complex ongoing fic-
tion. If you see with two eyes, one important part of 
that fiction, for example, is the illusion of a unified 
field of vision that the brain conveniently fabricates 
so that we don’t constantly worry about which eye to 
believe, or get distracted by the ever-present gap in 
the middle of that apparently continuous field. And 
this intriguing puzzle is just a tiny fraction of the 
lifelong project of self-belief. Buddhist philosophers, 
in promoting the doctrine of “nonself ” (albeit often 
with annoying inconsistencies), have been unique 
in the degree to which they have argued for explicit 
self-skepticism and self-detachment (Harvey 1995; 
Ricard and Singer 2017). In the West, there are also 
signs of a growing backlash literature against authen-
ticity addiction (Feldman 2014; York 2015; Lane and 
Mathes 2018).
Most modern psychological self-philosophies 
have gone the other way, fabricating false certainties 
about various forms of essentialized self. A striking 
example is the book Authentic: How To Be Yourself 
and Why It Matters, by psychotherapeutic researcher 
and positive psychology practitioner Stephen Joseph 
(2016). The cover shows fingerprints, symbolizing 
both personal uniqueness and the idea of the self as 
something essential and unchanging. The book is full 
of excellent advice about how not to be fake, but it 
is fundamentally misleading in its repeated claims 
that people have a single true self. Here, I want to 
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invite further exploration of how and why so many 
contemporary professional psychologists go to ex-
treme lengths not only to purvey pseudo-knowledge 
about the self but also to dress this up with an aura 
of empirical, scientific validation. I will argue that 
this is a form of contemporary religious mystifica-
tion that we will understand better if we expose it to 
skeptical and rational enquiry, recognizing it as part 
of psychology’s long and troubled relationship with 
religion.
Intelligent people understand that essentialist 
“folk” concepts of the true, autonomous, presocial, 
good inner self are empirically invalid even if they 
can sometimes be psychologically beneficial (Schütz 
and Baumeister 2017). It has also been argued that 
thinking about everyone as having a concealed inner 
true self promotes more considerate interethnic in-
teractions (Phillips et al. 2017; De Freitas and Cikara 
2018). If someone urges you to “be yourself ” or to play 
music “with soul,” you don’t necessarily need to ac-
cuse them of religious fraudulence, any more than you 
would if they used terms with religious origins like 
“inspiration” or “enthusiasm.” But if academics and 
professionals base their studies, their theories, and 
their life advice on illusions about essential spiritual 
selves in ways that appear to go beyond casual figura-
tive language, we may need to fight back. True-selfers 
pretend to know something they don’t know and can’t 
know: that “deep within” individuals there is an “in-
ner” self that is better, and more “real” than the more 
superficial identities, roles, personalities, or character 
traits. What pretends to be positive insight is in real-
ity nothing more than negative advice: “be yourself ” 
really only means “don’t be fake.” What pretends to 
be about the “truth” or “authentication” is really about 
evaluative approval. 
“TRUE SELF” FANTASIES 113
SELF-DECEPTION AND EXISTENTIAL 
WORRIES
The self-illusion need not involve fakery, and con-
versely fakery need not involve deception. You can 
wear make-up or indulge in plastic surgery without 
fooling yourself or anyone else. There is a fine line 
and a slippery slope between play (trying out differ-
ent roles), make-believe (pushing play toward fanta-
sy), and deceptive persuasion. So it is with “true self ” 
beliefs. While many early psychological self theorists 
write as if they really believed—and really wanted oth-
er people to believe—in an essential true self (Horney 
1950; Rogers 1961; Miller [1979] 1990), others have 
left things more ambiguous and emphasized rather the 
possible psychological benefits of acting as if we had an 
essential true self hidden within us (Schlegel, Hicks, 
and Christy 2016; Schütz and Baumeister 2017). The 
flip-side of “positive illusions,” however, is that they are 
plagued by the fear of disenchantment—the nagging 
feeling that our cherished beliefs, including belief in 
the self, may be false.
One of the most influential anthropology books of 
the twentieth century, Ernest Becker’s Denial of Death 
(1973), is rarely mentioned by anthropologists. It re-
mains, however, very influential in social psychology 
and the psychology of religion, and has been a founda-
tional text in Terror Management Theory—a creative 
vein of research investigating private and collective 
cultural responses to the uniquely human capability 
(and curse) of self-awareness (Greenberg, Solomon, 
and Pyszczynski 2015). Becker outlined many ways 
in which humans respond to realities that most of us 
would rather deny, such as our mortality and the likeli-
hood that our selves and our biographies are temporary 
fictions that ultimately have no particular meaning or 
FAKE114
significance. Becker’s work is opinionated and not well 
grounded in ethnographic evidence, but it is very use-
ful in highlighting forms of fear-based denialism that 
are commonly exploited, and in some ways exacerbat-
ed, by religious institutions. Nowadays, fantasies about 
selves and souls are keenly fostered by the global self-
help movement and by various psychological profes-
sions. Fear of death, and associated fears of existential 
incoherence or insignificance, seem to be at the core of 
many kinds of psychological and religious fakery.
Another exceptionally influential anthropology 
text, Erving Goffman’s Presentation of Self in Every-
day Life (1959), is somewhat better remembered by 
anthropologists but is still much more commonly 
cited by sociologists and even more so by psycholo-
gists, despite his overt antipathy to personality theo-
ry—something Becker was to echo with his claim that 
“human character is a vital lie,” that “man lives by lying 
to himself about himself ” (1973: 52). Goffman’s met-
aphor of life as staged drama, based on ethnographic 
fieldwork in a Shetland hotel, greatly strengthens our 
ability to recognize the self as an ongoing interactive 
project involving multiple forms of “impression man-
agement.” What Goffman might have done better, 
from a psychological perspective, would have been 
to recognize that this interactive process involves ef-
forts to persuade and impress oneself, not just other 
people. Self-persuasion and self-deception, brilliant-
ly illustrated by M.C. Escher’s self-drawing hands, 
often melt imperceptibly into one another. And the 
consequent uncertainties of agency and motivation 
leave philosophers with endless opportunities to argue 
over whether and in what sense self-deception is even 
possible.
It is virtually certain that most people in most 
countries today talk and worry more about their 
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identity, and about their happiness, than their grand-
parents did. New comforts and freedoms have pro-
duced both “selfie culture” and rampant self-doubt 
(Storr 2017). As with the fear of death, denial of 
the uncertainties and of the illusionary nature of the 
self commonly prompts strenuous self-deception. 
Plagued by fears of existential meaninglessness, peo-
ple express pseudo-confidence in an inner core iden-
tity, sometimes considered as a “spirit” or “soul” that 
precedes and survives our this-worldly experiences, 
and that reveals itself occasionally through tantaliz-
ing moments of “spiritual” peak experiences that offer 
glimpses of what it might feel like to be “at one” with 
this true self, and even “in harmony” with the cos-
mos. But instead of allowing people simply to enjoy 
moments of blissful self-transcendence for the elusive 
and fascinating experiences that they are, purveyors 
of the religious concept of “spiritual well-being” seek 
to persuade people that they can’t truly be themselves 
without imagining these moments as windows on a 
“deeper” truth that has something to do with their 
soul or destiny.
A huge global commerce in self-help advice feeds 
off this volatile combination of self-doubt and fake 
certainty (McGee 2005). Not only the obviously 
fraudulent self-help gurus but also professional coun-
sellors and psychologists urge you to find and express 
your “true self,” and to seek “authentic happiness” by 
“becoming who you are,” cultivating “self-determina-
tion,” and to pursue “fulfillment” as if you had a sin-
gle preordained destiny to fulfill. When these mer-
chants of individualistic pseudo-certainty sell “true 
self ” ideology, they are also, of course, simultaneously 
undermining people’s ability to live comfortably with 
ontological self-doubt. Terror Management Theory 
has taught us that somewhere in their consciousness, 
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people who say they believe in an afterlife also harbor 
an endlessly nagging fear of death. Similarly, it seems 
likely that those who cling to “true self ” beliefs are also 
revealing a deeply unsettling unwillingness to accept 
that the self is an illusion. Professionals who encour-
age this kind of fatalism or learned helplessness seem 
to have a moral duty to question why they do so, and 
whether it promotes or inhibits well-being.
TRUE SELF IDEOLOGY AS A RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF
Even by his own standards, Clifford Geertz excelled 
himself in providing quotable arguments about West-
ern personhood, and about religious belief. I want to 
link these two in order to explore contemporary relig-
iosity in the “positive psychology” movement in which 
selves often appear sanctified, and “true selves” com-
monly linked with the concept of “spiritual well-being.” 
On personhood, Geertz argued that 
the Western conception of the person as a bound-
ed, unique, more or less integrated motivational and 
cognitive universe … [is] a rather peculiar idea with-
in the context of the world’s cultures. (Geertz 1974: 
30–31)
On religious make-believe, Geertz claimed that 
the religious perspective differs from the com-
mon-sensical… deliberately manufacturing an air of 
semblance and illusion, it deepens the concern with 
fact and seeks to create an aura of utter actuality. It is 
this sense of the “really real” upon which the religious 
perspective rests. (Geertz 1966: 27–28)
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Geertz was right that religion often entails noncasual 
belief in things that aren’t true. Nonetheless, a lot of 
ambiguity hinges on the “aura of utter actuality” and 
the “sense of really real,” tautologies that hint at tan-
talizingly unstable combinations of belief and doubt. 
Skepticism antennae are alerted when people claim 
that they are getting in touch with their “true selves,” 
or that their experiences are “really spiritual” or their 
emotions are “deep.” Believing in the self is very dif-
ferent from these kinds of flagrantly counterrational 
religious beliefs, because it is likely that by default peo-
ple take their own identity for granted in everyday life. 
Still, self-belief is something that requires self-persua-
sion, and this can become “religious” insofar as identity 
claims involve sanctifying a version of the self in or-
der to put it beyond debate, or when autobiographical 
narratives seek attention or approval by labeling some 
experiences as “spiritual.” 
Geertz no doubt exaggerated the uniqueness of 
Western personhood for polemical effect, but in the 
United States there is some fairly extreme rhetoric 
promoting the sanctity of the individual. When com-
bined with the emphasis on originality and authen-
ticity in “true self ” discourse, this puts pressure on 
individuals not only to believe in their own bounded 
coherence and uniqueness, but to flaunt it. In a fasci-
nating short section on naming practices in the United 
States, Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner (2006) note 
that in California 30 percent of black girls are given a 
name that is unique among every baby born that year 
in California. Ironically, trying too hard to be a unique 
individual can backfire, because there were “228 babies 
named Unique during the 1990s alone, and 1 each of 
Uneek, Uneque, and Uneqqee.” They don’t say whether 
anyone has called their offspring “Authentic” or “Gen-
uine,” but you can see that a theme here is parents 
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trying to give their children a head start in the pursuit 
of distinctive individualism, and that this harmonizes 
with the popular rhetoric about “being yourself ” and 
“becoming who you are.”
The important link between personhood and reli-
gious belief is that the bounded, unique, and integrated 
self isn’t the kind of entity that we can take for granted. 
Like gods, fairies, and witches, the self is the kind of 
elusive entity that is commonly promoted by religious 
dogma and persuasion, precisely because it isn’t real. 
Certainly, individuals exist, but coherent and consist-
ent identities and approved personal biographies are 
things that need to be worked at. And in the modern 
era, one way of doing this is to persuade people to be-
lieve that they are, in Geertz’s terms, “really real”—that 
there is hidden somewhere a destined, “true” version of 
themselves that they should try to discover and express.
PSYCHOLOGY, “SPIRIT-SPEAK,” AND 
RELIGIOUS SELF-DECEPTION
On March 20, 2016, at its annual event to remind 
humanity of the importance of happiness, the United 
Nations welcomed several speakers to its headquarters 
to tell humanity about “spiritual” aspects of the pursuit 
of well-being.1 There were some serious well-being re-
searchers, but the speakers also included Sonia Em-
manuel, a “holistic coach and energy medicine expert,” 
who informed the crowd that happiness promotes hor-
mones that “vibrate at the highest frequency”; Stefano 
Bizzotto on “holistic energy treatments”; a “spiritual 
1. http://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/160320-happiness.
pdf.
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healer” known as Crótalo Sésamo (born Alessandro 
Zattoni) who “teaches astral traveling and out-of-
body experiences” and represents the “spiritual com-
munity” of Federazione Damanhur; Paul McKenna, a 
stage hypnotist with a bad reputation for fraudulent 
health claims, spreading nonsense about paranormal 
phenomena, and suing people who question the valid-
ity of his “PhD in hypnosis”; several representatives of 
“United Beings,” a somewhat obscure organization in 
Italy that says it specializes in “spiritual research” and 
promotion of belief in miracles; a “holistic therapist,” 
Patrizia Coppola; and Roberto Cossa, a “Reiki master 
and entrepreneur in ecological wellness.” Remember, 
these exponents of New Age spiritualism were at an 
event in the United Nations headquarters, attended by 
ambassadors from around the world and by numerous 
A-list celebrities and major press agencies. But do the 
advocates of spiritualism have any coherent or useful 
thoughts to offer concerning distinctively “spiritual” 
components of well-being, or pathways to well-being?
Mystical and religious perspectives, let’s not forget, 
have always been major driving forces in the develop-
ment of modern psychology, despite the best efforts of 
secularizers like Sigmund Freud (Rank 1950). Through 
my university I have access to numerous journals with 
“spiritual” in the title, most of which seem to encourage 
authors simply to take the concept of spirit for grant-
ed. These include, for example, the Journal of Spiritual 
Formation and Soul Care, which promotes application 
of Christian theology to therapeutic and pastoral con-
cerns, always on the assumption that “God” and “spirit” 
are critical factors in healing; Spiritual Psychology and 
Counseling, which publishes articles based on empirical 
care and therapy work by people who mainly seem to 
treat “spiritual” just as a euphemism for “religious”; and 
the Journal for Spiritual & Consciousness Studies, which 
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publishes shameless nonsense purveying pseudo-sci-
ence about revelatory dreams, near-death experiences, 
spiritual travel, and clairvoyance, many of which claim 
some kind of supporting scientific evidence.
Did you know that in the nineteenth century there 
was a time when the secular term “mentology” might 
have prevailed over the more mystical term “psychol-
ogy” as the label for the scientific study of the mind? 
That might have happened had there been a critical 
mass of rationalists brave enough to accept that some-
thing as elusive and mysterious as human conscious-
ness could be studied without resorting to deceptive 
spirit-speak. We might then have had mentosomatic 
illness, mentiatrists, mentotherapies, and mentodelic 
drugs. Instead, we are left with a labeling of the mind 
as “psyche,” an ancient Greek term for “soul,” with all 
the attendant quandaries about which kinds of soul 
beliefs psychologists thought they were adopting. 
There is no substantial parallel scholarship for “pneu-
matology,” the study of what the Greeks called “spirit,” 
and many psychologists are in practice uninterested in 
distinctions between mind, soul, and spirit. But some 
modern mental professionals don’t think this superfi-
cial mystification of the mind goes far enough. Fre-
quent use of the term “psychospiritual” is indicative of 
the semi-religious bet-hedging that pervades modern 
psychology: insofar as “psyche” has been secularized as 
a synonym for “mind,” a new drive toward re-enchant-
ment invokes “spirit” and “soul” as reminders of the 
mystifying ineffability of the life force. 
A Google Scholar search for “true self ” in titles 
shows a steady steep increase to seventy hits for 2017 
from fifteen for 1987. Widening the search to include 
titles that mention related terms, such as “authentic 
self,” “psychological authenticity,” “personal authen-
ticity,” “self-realization,” or “real self,” shows a tenfold 
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increase from 1,500 items in 1987 to 14,600 items in 
2017. There was also a tenfold increase over the same 
period in titles using “spiritual well-being,” “spiritual 
wellness,” “self-transcendence,” “psychospiritual,” 
“spiritual psychology”; and a twentyfold increase in ar-
ticles using these terms in the main text. “Spiritual in-
telligence,” “spirituality quotient,” and “spiritual health” 
were rarely used by academics before this century, but 
have both seen a fourfold increase in titles in the past 
decade, and are now roughly forty times as common 
as “religious intelligence.” Titles with “authenticity” 
increased more than tenfold, and titles with “fake” in-
creased fortyfold from 32 to 1,300. These statistics are 
all only very rough indicators, but they don’t just reflect 
overall increases in numbers of academic publications. 
They all reflect substantial increases in academic atten-
tion devoted to these terms.
As with most religious dogma, we can’t fully under-
stand the social functions and effects of “spirit-speak” 
without recognizing that it does tend to involve decep-
tion. Religious faith, worship, and doctrines have done 
much good in the world but they can’t be properly 
understood without recognizing that they are forms of 
personal self-deception, collective make-believe, and 
manipulative deception of other people. We undera-
nalyze the whole concept of the sacred if we fail to 
observe the close relationships between sanctification 
and deception: by rendering knowledge sacred, sanc-
tifiers are trying to put it beyond normal rational and 
moral scrutiny, often for strategic purposes. This ap-
plies to claims about “spirituality” as much as to claims 
about the existence of a “true self.”
This is an extremely important point for students 
of religion to note: far too few texts on religious doc-
trine have even bothered to highlight the deceptive na-
ture of religious metaphors and myths, and to ask why 
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deliberate deception is seen as necessary in doctrines 
purporting to seek and promote truth and goodness. 
Whether due to careless neglect, or politeness, or fear 
of reprisal, this omission impoverishes the substance 
and plausibility of religious studies. There are three 
things you need to know about the meanings people 
attach to “spirituality”: 
R5 Most writers and speakers make no attempt to 
define the term or outline in a general sense their 
purposes in using it.
R5 When people do discuss definition, they nearly al-
ways begin by acknowledging that it is extremely 
vague and very diverse in its associations.
R5 Definitions offered are typically as circular as the 
phrase “it is what it is” and as antidefinitional as 
“you’ll know it when you see it.” In a futile effort 
to clarify something ineffable and ill-understood 
by reference to something else equally ineffable, 
they refer to other vague abstractions such as 
meaning, the sublime, religiosity, holiness, experi-
ence of divinity, and transcendence.
 (Gardner 2000; Buzan 2001; Fuller 2001; Solomon 
2002; Sheldrake 2007; Comte-Sponville 2008; 
Heelas 2008; De Botton 2012; Harris 2014) 
It would clearly be unfair and unhelpful to object to 
studying “spirituality” as a “folk psychology” concept. 
Scholars can legitimately take an empathic and respect-
ful interest in people’s beliefs about “spirit” or “spirits” 
or “spirituality” just as they do with people’s beliefs in 
an afterlife, in deities, in witches, or in astrology or ho-
meopathy. It is also helpful to observe whether there 
are any systematic connections between such beliefs 
and some aspects of well-being. What isn’t acceptable 
is to refer to any of these beliefs as “dimensions” of 
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well-being. Scholars who develop and use measures for 
“spiritual well-being” and “spiritual intelligence,” like 
those who measure “personal authenticity,” are treating 
the ineffable as if it were effable.
CONCLUSION: FROM “TRUE SELF” 
TO SELF-TRANSCENDENCE AND 
SOCIO-CULTURAL AUTHENTICATION
At risk of overgeneralizing about the copious and 
highly varied anthropological literature on the self, 
most of this addresses self-conceptualization and asso-
ciated social performance and role enactment, whereas 
a relatively minor portion seems to be about the mo-
tivations and purposes associated with self-making. In 
psychological research on selfhood, by contrast, there 
is a very substantial tradition associating self-concepts 
with lifelong self-making projects. Among these, two 
contrasting but closely associated objectives stand out: 
R5 introspective attention toward building a better 
self from the inside out, and 
R5 extrospective attention toward self-transcendence. 
This division reflects two very different associations 
of “authenticity”: introspective self-verification, and so-
cio-cultural authentication. It also applies to conceptu-
alizations of selves as “spirits” or “souls.” Just as theo-
logians and clergy have for thousands of years enjoyed 
and suffered fierce debates as to whether “God” is “out 
there” or “inside” us, so too do psycho-spirituality ad-
vocates seem to embroil themselves in troubling con-
fusions as to whether the “spirit” or the “true self ” is to 
be sought “inside” us or externally, through “transcend-
ence” or even “self-transcendence.” 
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Abraham Maslow, the godfather of “self-actualiza-
tion” and one of the most important influences on the 
contemporary “positive psychology” movement world-
wide, seems to have intuited this problem toward the 
end of his life. If you Google “Maslow pyramid” you 
will see multiple diagrammatic versions of his famous 
“hierarchy of needs,” nearly all of which put “self-actu-
alization” at the apex of his model of human needs and 
aspirations. These correctly reflect most of Maslow’s 
writing on the subject of motivation, which was not 
only highly individualistic but also based on an appar-
ent belief that all humans should try to discern, actu-
alize, and express a single “true” version of themselves. 
Later in his career, however, Maslow began fa-
voring a very different concept for the apex of his 
hierarchy: “self-transcendence,” in recognition that 
peak experiences often arise from detaching from 
self-concern in various ways, such as through social en-
gagements or communing with nature (Koltko-Rivera 
2006). An analogous process is the more recent devel-
opment of “self-determination theory,” a major body of 
psychological research closely associated with positive 
psychology. Often highly polemical in contrasting “in-
trinsic motivation” as good and “extrinsic motivation” 
as bad, and in positing the mature, autonomous indi-
vidual as someone who has broken free from restric-
tive parental and society norms, self-determination 
theorists nonetheless accept that selves develop and 
flourish through relationships, and that it can be psy-
chologically healthy to recognize that belief in an es-
sential, eternal self is false (Ryan and Deci 2017: 63). 
In this regard, they join most social psychologists in 
accepting that we must complement Western “inde-
pendent self ” rhetoric by learning from non-Western 
cultures about the value of “interdependent self ” con-
cepts (Markus and Kitayama 1991).
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As anthropologists we are schooled in the fine 
art of “making sense,” particularly by using charitable 
relativism and empathy to render strange beliefs and 
practices more comprehensible and more forgivable. I 
have tried to show here that if we are to appreciate and 
derive value from “true self ” discourse, we are obliged 
first to expose its deceptions and try to understand 
why they happen. It seems likely that the appetite for 
true-self fantasies will continue to flourish worldwide 
for some time, even if most people who buy into that 
rhetoric are also at least dimly aware that selves aren’t 
the kinds of entities that can preexist real, culturally 
embedded, and socially interactive upbringing.
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